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Privately Contracted Military Firms (PCMFs) are in use throughout the globe by the U.S. 
government.  Their role has become so intertwined with the demands of the Department 
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imagine operating in support of U.S. national interests, without them.  But such a 
relationship is not without its pitfalls.  The quantities, costs, and functions of today’s 
PCMFs have grown at an astounding rate, and so too, the legal concerns their 
employment invariably raises.  This thesis will address these pitfalls, the inadequacies of 
the current legal measures designed to resolve them, and recommend steps to correct 
them.  The author suggests that, once these reforms are met, it will legitimize PCMF 
utilization, facilitate their integration into national security planning, ease domestic 
perception regarding their existence, and placate international concerns regarding their 
use.  The author further contends, however, that until these obstacles are addressed, no 
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Contracts. Outsourcing. Private security.  Not so long ago, these terms were more 
synonymous with corporate business practices than elements of warfare.  But times have 
changed.  No longer is the U.S. military alone conducting the myriad of tasks involved 
within the full spectrum of “modern warfare”—a term which now implies reconstruction 
and diplomacy in addition to, and often more so than, actual combat.  There are three 
primary reasons for this trend and the author recommends that they be retained 
throughout this thesis as no serious analytical discussions can occur without their 
recognition.    
First, as Thomas Bruneau states in Patriots for Profit, “The federal government 
has spent twenty years downsizing the civil service…in the belief that privatizing as 
many government functions as possible would introduce private-sector efficiencies.”1  
This proved highly beneficial for the privately contracted military firm which became an 
almost overnight commodity post–Cold War.  Years later, the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, coupled with the federal job cuts, opened the door to a nearly infinite 
market. 
Second, the military’s insistence on its current Counter Insurgency tactics, or 
COIN, has dictated that U.S. forces place an onus on winning the hearts and minds of an 
indigenous population.  This has meant an extraordinary shift in capabilities focusing on 
the market for much needed humanitarian supplies, construction efforts, and training 
programs—ranging from advising host-nation civic-administrations to training law 
enforcement officials nationwide.   This “nation-building” mind-set is challenging 
enough for an organization never intended to adopt it, but even more so when one 
considers that the all-volunteer military is already strained by unprecedented deployment 
rotations, training cycles, and an almost unsustainable operational tempo designed to 
placate both. 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 163. 
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Third, there is a strong demand for protection and security measures beyond that 
which is habitually provided by the U.S. military.  For example, in a sensitive geo-
political theater, like Iraq, security can mean everything from guarding VIPs to securing 
critical facilities.  This is especially true when you consider that elements of the U.S. 
State Department (DoS) and agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) often take the lead in the aforementioned markets.  Furthermore, 
these elements have never had any substantial custodial relationship with the U.S. 
military or the DoD.  To do so would imply subordination rather than equality—an 
occurrence that, rightfully, should be avoided.  The government’s push to privatize 
certain facets of the federal market, the nuances of COIN tactics, and the demand for 
tailored security are separate but linked causal variables in the proliferation of Privately 
Contracted Military Firms. 
The Privately Contracted Military Firm (PCMF)—a relatively new term—is a 
dynamic and controversial entity.  Fluid and adaptable beyond the standard conventions 
of most corporations, they are not restricted to geographical boundaries and, by design, 
can take extraordinary measures to navigate around legal restrictions intended to contain 
them.  The PCMF is the focal point of this thesis, but it is part of the larger Private 
Military Industry (PMI).  Interestingly, there is, as of yet, no universally accepted 
definition of the PMI even though its resources and provisions have permeated 
throughout the entire process of U.S. military force projection and diplomatic influence.  
The industry—through various PCMFs—manages all manner of contracted functions 
within all areas of U.S. national interests.  Yet, ironically, it is seldom referred to publicly 
as a legitimate force multiplier, even though its existence, and subsequent inclusion, 
within the parameters of modern warfare is universally understood.  This presents an 
interesting paradigm.  Outside  the specific language of any given contract between a 
PCMF and the hiring party, there is little understanding of their costs, functions, 
expectations, and legal boundaries.  This is perhaps by design as such ambiguity provides 
both the desired operational latitude for the principal and plausible deniability for the 
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agent.2  This opaque way of doing business carries with it a stench of corruption and 
erodes public and international trusts in the motives behind the efforts.  The U.S., as the 
standard bearer for emerging democratic societies, needs to set a different course. 
Almost every PCMF is viewed with some degree of skepticism by the 
international and domestic public.  This apprehension stems from poor business practices, 
accusations of over-inflated charges, and tragic consequences garnering global attention 
and exposing little (if any) substantial legal control measures.  Favorable public opinion, 
however, although coveted by democratic governments, is not the determining factor in 
continuing business relationships.  If it were, then the logical choice would be for the 
U.S. to distance itself from PCMF utilization and, ultimately, sever its ties to the industry 
as a whole.  But the truth of the matter is that the PMI has become so intertwined in U.S. 
force projection that severing ties with it is neither reasonable nor altogether prudent.  
The PMI, after all, provides resources and capabilities that allow the U.S. to conduct 
global force projection far more efficiently that it could otherwise.  Since separating the 
DoD from the PMI seems altogether untenable, it begs the paramount question: “how can 
the U.S. remain reliant on the capabilities of the PMI, i.e., continue to award lucrative 
contracts to PCMFs, without damaging its internationally (and sometimes domestically) 
delicate reputation”? 
This thesis holds that the quid pro quo relationship between the U.S. and the PMI 
can and should be better defined through legitimate measures of reform.  The PNSR3 has 
already identified the need for reforms across the entire U.S. national security sector but 
                                                 
2 I am referring here to the principal-agent problem.  In political science and economics, the principal-
agent problem or agency dilemma treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent, such as the problem of potential moral hazard and 
conflict of interest, in as much as the principal is – presumably – hiring the agent to pursue the principal's 
interests. The principal-agent problem is found in most employer/employee relationships. Political science 
has noted the problems inherent in the delegation of legislative authority to bureaucratic agencies. In this 
case the principal would be the hiring party while the PCMF represents the agent.   
3 The Project for National Security Reform, a congressionally funded think tank begun in 2006 with 
the goal of recommending and implementing, where applicable, institutional reform measures within the 
U.S. national security system. The director, James R. Locher III, was a prominent figure during the 
development of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  PNSR’s first report, Forging 
a New Shield, was a hefty 830 page document.  See, also, Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 
Introduction. 
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unfortunately, their report has remained largely contained within “the beltway”4   
Although nowhere near as large or detailed, this current project at least hopes to have a 
distant relation—even if only in intent—to the ambitions of the PNSR.  The 
recommendations advanced herein would set the conditions for PCMFs to become much 
more accountable for their actions universally, i.e., to the hiring principal, the state of 
origin, and to the state within which the PCMF would conduct its operations.  Further, the 
recommendations should go a long way toward fostering a better understanding of their 
capabilities and limitations.  This would, and more importantly, should, facilitate the 
inclusion of PCMFs and their parent PMI into the published national security strategies 
of the United States.  This move would not be without controversy, but it is altogether 
fitting that the U.S. take this major step forward.  It is a measure that is past due. 
Whatever opinions of them may be, PCMFs are a twenty-first century reality and should 
not be met with twentieth century protocol.  Furthermore, by including them in the 
national strategies, the U.S. will have, potentially, introduced the PCMFs as possible 
third-party actors, thereby fostering greater transparency and democratic control over 
their utilization.  The implications of the former would foster better domestic opinions of 
an open government while the latter should take measurable steps to strengthen 
international relations through an open foreign policy. 
This thesis advances the hypothesis that establishing a status–based legal 
framework5 will promote legitimacy, increase effectiveness, and mitigate concerns—both 
domestically and abroad.  This will be accomplished through six chapters.  Chapter I has 
already introduced a relatively new term into the field’s lexicon—the Privately 
Contracted Military Firm (PCMF)—a term that should be retained as a necessary tool in 
defining further PCMF sub-classifications and, ultimately, advance this thesis’ endeavors.  
Next, Chapter II will examine the origin(s) and evolution of PCMFs as well as classify 
them into six separate entities.  Chapter III will look to the Vietnam War and the 
relationships and decisions within certain political circles that this author suggests set 
                                                 
4 Washington, DC. 
5 I am referring here to legal parameters designed to effectively monitor and influence PCMF 
behavior.  This transcends the expectations defined (if at all) within the contractual agreement by codifying 
international legal norms.  The framework would be an institutionalized process but adaptable enough to be 
applicable to any of the six PCMF classifications defined Chapter II. 
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precedents cementing future U.S. reliance on PCMFs.  Chapter IV addresses PCMF 
utilization in modern warfare—specifically within the Iraqi theater of operations—as a 
likely trend so intrinsic to U.S. force projection that it requires amending the way the 
U.S. military conducts business.  Chapter V builds upon the latter and addresses the 
peculiar lack of official recognition of PCMFs by the U.S. throughout its published 
network of security strategies and the effects these omissions may be having on U.S. 
civil–military relations.  Chapter VI presents the current legal measures in place that hold 
PCMFs accountable, describe the weaknesses within these measures, and examines the 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE—HOW DID WE GET 
HERE? 
The members of the [private military security] firm were polite and 
generally helpful, but the ambiguity between who they were and what they 
were doing always hung in the air.  They were employees of a private 
company, but were performing tasks inherently military.  It just did not 
settle with the way [Americans] tended to understand either business or 
warfare.  However, there they were, simply doing their jobs, but in the 
process, altering the entire security balance of the region.6 
 
The emergence of PCMFs as U.S. force multipliers is nothing new, but their level 
of integration into current American military operations borders on the alarming.  This 
chapter will take a look at this relationship in two distinct parts.  Part one is dedicated to 
history of the PCMF and discusses reasons why the U.S. has come to utilize PCMFs so 
extensively.  Part two defines the PCMF and classifies its sub-sets into six separate 
functions, offering insight into each one’s respective capabilities and provisions.  When 
taken together, these two parts will lay the groundwork for the reform measures I believe 
necessary for proper legal oversight and control. 
A. ORIGINS AND RISE OF THE PRIVATELY CONTRACTED MILITARY 
FIRM (PCMF) 
The U.S. military has a long history of utilizing civilian support during military 
operations.  Even during the Revolutionary War, General George Washington's 
Continental Army relied on civilians for transportation, carpentry, engineering, food, and 
medical services.  The benefits of such an arrangement were immediately recognizable.  
By utilizing civilians to perform such services, soldiers were able to focus on their core 
task of war fighting.7  The relationship was mutually beneficial as the civilians performed 
functions that, according to Steven Zamparelli were either “too menial for soldiers or 
                                                 
6 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), vii.  This quote describes members of the PCMF – MPRI during Singer’s 
encounter with them in the Balkans, circa 1996. 
7 William W. Epley, “Civilian Support of Field Armies,” Army Logistician 22 (November/December 
1990): 1–6.  
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were [already] well-established or specialized in commercial industry.”8  Contracting out 
services grew in scope over both World Wars and Korea, and by the time America had 
entered Vietnam it had become an accepted practice.  Although not a common 
occurrence, soldiers had grown accustomed to seeing U.S. civilians on the battlefield and 
this held true until about twenty years ago, as the ratio between civilian contractors and 
soldiers remained relatively constant (see Table 1).  The end of the Cold War, however, 
signaled a change, shifting formerly random encounters between soldiers and civilians 
into an everyday, everyplace occurrence. 
The end of the Cold War brought substantial changes to the way the U.S. 
projected its forces into areas of geo-political interest.  The dissolution of the former 
Soviet Union created a market for customizable security forces, consulting services, and 
logistical/support firms almost overnight.  The U.S. military for obvious reasons could 
not provide these measures in any substantial fashion, yet still had the desire to protect 
U.S. interests in Western Europe.  PCMFs were quick to capitalize on the European 
security vacuum and found a willing financier in an eager American government. 
If Post-Cold War provided the initial push for PCMF growth, then the aftermath 
of 9/11 could be credited with providing a substantial surge.  The satellites of the former 
Soviet Union were of course of U.S. strategic interests but the events of 9/11 brought us 
into war.  For the first time in a decade we had a declared enemy—Al Qaeda—and the 
need to rapidly establish a decisive military presence on foreign soil—Afghanistan. The 
war in Afghanistan would strengthen U.S. reliance on PCMFs.  As the U.S. turned its eye 






                                                 
8 Steven J. Zamparelli, "Competitive Sourcing and Privatization: Contractors on the Battlefield: What 
Have We Signed Up For?" Air Force Journal of Logistics (Fall, 1999): 14, taken from Stephen M. 
Blizzard’s article “Increasing Reliance on Contractors on the Battlefield; How Do We Keep from Crossing 
the Line?” Air Force Journal of Logistics 23 no. 3 (1999): 7. 
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Estimated ratio of 
contractor to military 
personnel* 
    
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6 
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1,000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a. 
World War I 85 2,000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 5,400 1 to 7 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5 
Gulf War 9** 500 1 to 55** 
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of 2010*** 150 150 1 to 1 
 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from William W. Epley, “Civilian Support of Field 
Armies,” Army Logistician, vol. 22 (November/December 1990), pp. 30-35; Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the 
Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 23, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 10-19; 
Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting for Contractor Services 
and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations (October 2007), p. 12; Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for 
Profit, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 115.  Data in the Public Domain. 
NOTE: n.a. = not available 
*For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the U.S. 
government.  However, because most civilians present during military operations are contractor personnel, the 
inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the calculated ratio of contractor personnel to military 
personnel. 
**The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  Personnel associated with those provisions are not included in the data or the ratio. 
***For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of the Iraq 
Theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.9 
                                                 
9 The notes from Table 1.1 are taken exclusively from Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 115, updated through open source. 
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Despite the swift expansion in PCMF growth post-Cold War, up until 2001, 
PCMFs had largely gone unnoticed by the general public, having functioned in areas of 
both geographical and operational disinterest.  Their size and scope were comparatively 
small to that of the military, and most of their operations had focused on VIP security 
measures or serving in advisory positions.  But the United States’ declaration of a “global 
war on terror” and, subsequently, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq would expand 
both their roles and their demands.  The United States and its allies would rapidly need to 
mobilize specialized security forces with tremendous operational latitude.  PCMFs seized 
the chance to fill this need and, a decade later, they are still evolving.   
Although contractors, as a whole, have been tied to military force projection 
throughout history, the rise of the Privately Contracted Military Firm (PCMF) and, 
subsequently, the degree to which they now serve as force multipliers and, in some 
instances, almost entirely independent options, is unprecedented.  In fact, since 2003, the 
ratio of contractors to soldiers on the battlefield—specifically, in Iraq—has evolved such 
that now it has swung in favor of the contractors.  This statistic was made dramatically 
clear during the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, wherein contractors outnumbered U.S. 
servicemen and women by 2–1.  These figures are sobering from a financial point of 
view, as the economic effect of employing contractors is significant.  But perhaps of even 
greater significance is the political controversy surrounding the utilization of civilian 
contractors in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives on foreign soil.  Such a course of action 
has inherently delicate political concerns, as the court of international public opinion has 
rarely viewed hired civilian security entities in a positive light.  Over the past several 
years U.S. Administrations have omitted the mention of PCMFs (at least directly) as 
force providers within any of the nation’s three security strategy documents—a move 
designed to placate international concerns over their use.  But the omission is strikingly 
peculiar, as the utilization of PCMFs is a very real and seemingly necessary occurrence 
during times of conflict.  In fact, PCMFs are now so intrinsically tied to modern U.S. 
force projection that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) mentions their costs and 
contributions despite omission by the respective strategic documents.  The author 
recognizes that Administrations rightfully seek to craft documents that provide them with 
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political latitude and, where necessary, plausible deniability.  But excluding PCMFs from 
the security strategies is ignoring the elephant in the living room and, in actuality, 
providing the companies themselves with enough leeway to operate outside of traditional 
legal measures and largely absent from public view, subsequently providing contracted 
personnel, provisions, and resources at a potentially higher cost—both financially and 
politically. 
Since 2001, the world has changed dramatically.  Although the private military 
industry (PMI) as a whole has been intrinsically linked to U.S. force projection, its 
influence on American executive political decisions was largely unknown—or, at least 
not publicly accepted.  During Vietnam for example, companies such as Brown & Root 
held significant positions of influence due to their enhanced logistical support 
capabilities, but this influence remained largely contained within high–level, political 
circles.   The end of the Cold War also contributed significantly to the rise of the PMI—
in fact, some scholarly works point to the Cold War’s demise as the dominating factor for 
PMI proliferation.  Although this thesis agrees with the latter conclusion, it points out that 
there was little domestic recognition, outside confined, senior-ranking, political circles, 
over PMI proliferation.  Post–2001, however, ushered in unprecedented public awareness 
that U.S. reliance on logistical/support companies like Brown & Root was not only an 
almost unavoidable necessity, but also a means of profit for similar privatized 
companies.10  Furthermore, the U.S. needed rapid security capabilities seemingly beyond 
the reach of the U.S. armed forces.  Companies such as the former Blackwater quickly 
filled the void and expanded the scope and responsibilities of privatized security far 
beyond what it had previously been.  The two examples listed above are indicative of 
how the U.S. operates across the entire spectrum of modern warfare.  From combat 
missions, to contingency operations, to humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations, 
the U.S. is continuing to outsource its requirements at an alarming rate. 
                                                 
10 The events of 9/11 triggered the invasion into Afghanistan and had significant influence over the 
decision to invade Iraq.  The DoD needed both large–scale logistical support and tactical security 
enhancement with rapid deployment capabilities beyond those of the U.S. military at the time.  Coupled 
with the attractiveness of keeping military personnel numbers low, PCMFs became a valuable commodity.  
The confluence of events post–9/11 altered, perhaps forever, U.S. modern warfare. 
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As the leader of the free world, the United States is looked upon as a trend setter 
for democratic progress.  Consequently, the United States’ extensive use of PCMFs has 
caused others to seek similar recourses and facilitated continued acceptance of PCMFs as 
a ready and relevant option for security-force enhancement.  Ironically, the precedents set 
by the United States’ commitment to PCMF utilization may actually be changing how 
U.S. force projection is perceived and/or accepted internationally.  The growing demands 
for immediate security, with minimal public scrutiny, coupled with the actions of the U.S. 
have caused PCMFs to grow swiftly.  But this rapid expansion of force options has 
generated divisive debates, often testing the boundaries of civil-military relations and 
redefining a states’ “monopoly of force.” 
Utilization of PCMFs may allow a nation or organization to buy or supplement its 
own security for an indeterminate period of time.  This provides the consumer with 
significant political latitude and a certain degree of separation, i.e., PCMFs offer 
plausible deniability of active, uniformed service involvement while still providing para-
military forces capable of preserving states’ self-interests.  But sometimes the purchase of 
this commodity can have horrific consequences, actually causing strategy to drive 
policy—a situation that, according to Clausewitz, is to be avoided at all costs,11 e.g., 
Blackwater, Worldwide, Inc., Nisour Square, Baghdad, 2007.12 
The possibilities of backlash have not deterred growth, however, and PCMFs 
have found an unmistakable niche in modern times.  So much so that personnel assigned 
to PCMFs now outnumber military personnel in Iraq two to one.13 Such figures are 
generating significant questions.  Has the proliferation of PCMFs grown so large that 
they are now part of the decision cycle in planning the U.S. armed forces’ structure, role, 
and involvement in future conflicts?  If so, why are they not officially recognized by U.S. 
                                                 
11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), passim.  
12 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater, The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: 
Nation Books, 2007). 
13 Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to the United States 
Congress, SIGIR, July 2011. 
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administrations?14  How are the decisions to utilize PCMFs (and their subsequent 
actions) affecting U.S. foreign relations?  Should the international arena recognize 
PCMFs as third-party actors (after nation-states and militaries)?  And, what are the 
consequences if they do?15 
The recognition of PCMF relevance raises some significant concerns.  Critics 
argue that by utilizing PCMFs, America is simply employing mercenaries operating 
outside the law, and, therefore, that the risks of PCMF employment are not acceptable—
politically and economically.  Conversely, proponents might concede that the existence 
of PCMFs prevents a monopoly of force—a threat to democracy professed by the 
Founding Fathers16 and summarized by Samuel Huntington’s book The Soldier and the 
State.17   PCMFs would, therefore, not only be necessary in the ideology of the former, 
but beneficial in the missive of the latter, as an entity existing outside direct political 
influence while operating with military-like professionalism. 
B. CLASSIFYING THE PCMF 
Perhaps one of the biggest hurdles in achieving any substantial reform revolves 
around the tremendous amount of confusion involving the naming conventions within the 
private military industry.  Lack of any significantly definitive classification has made 
enforcing any tangible legal control measures almost impossible as the expected behavior 
and/or provisions of the respective contracted entity are ambiguous at best.  
Classification, therefore, does more than accurately name the company and actually 
implies a pre-meditated course of action and makes enforcing accountability much more 
                                                 
14 The U.S. has recognized the importance of PCMFs within the QDR but this is post-facto.  Oddly, 
there is no mention, at least directly, of PCMFs within any of the United States’ official security 
documents: the National Security Strategy (NSS) issued from the President, the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) – issued from the Secretary of Defense, or the National Military Strategy (NMS) – issued from the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
15 The 2006 Quadrennial Review, (QDR) recognizes Private Military Companies and the impacts that 
their tactical and operational effects are having in the strategic realm. 
16 Michael I. Meyerson, Liberty's Blueprint: How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, 
Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981, first ed. published 1957).  In this instance I am referring 
to Sam Huntington’s theory of “professionalizing” the military’s officer corps as a means to ensure 
objective civilian control through indirect means. 
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feasible.  Drawing heavily from Peter Singer and Huma T. Yasin,18 this section will 
define the privately contracted military firm and its sub-classifications. 
Originally, most scholarly works and those within certain political/business 
circles referred to the “private military firm,” or “private military company” but this 
implied an offensive characteristic.  Trying to distance themselves from this military-
centric classification, the companies began to refer to themselves as “private security 
companies.”  Most recently, these two terms have been combined to form the name: 
“private military security companies.”  Although these terms are still much in use today 
throughout most scholarly works, this thesis argues that the term privately contracted 
military firm, or PCMF, best encompasses the interested point of study.  This proposal is 
accurately supported by Huma Yasin who “refers to the industry as ‘privately contracted 
military firms’ to highlight the three essential, defining characteristics of the PCMF:  the 
organizations are (1) privately held corporations; (2) employed under a contractual 
arrangement; (3) performing traditional military duties.”19 
Further complicating the previously held methods of classifying PCMFs was the 
suggested implementation of “terms such as ‘active’ and ‘passive’ and ‘armed’ and 
‘unarmed’ but these labels ignore the vast differences between PCMFs in scope and 
objective.”20  Peter Singer, one of the leading experts in PCMF operations, suggests that 
the PCMFs are so broad in their provisions, often blending economic and military 
fundamentals, that the industry should be further broken down (and classified) based on 
the range of the services they can provide.21  Singer identifies three broad categories of 
PCMFs but Yasin takes this provision further and advances six separate categories—each 
of which this thesis concludes is wholly applicable to its own endeavors and so, includes 
them here: 
                                                 
18 P. W. Singer, cited in Huma Yasin, Playing Catchup: Proposing the Creation of Status-Based 
Regulations to Bring Private Military Contractor Firms Within the Purview of International and Domestic 
Law.  Professionl Report written as a LL.M. Candidate, Southern Methodist University School of Law. 
2012. 
19 Yasin, Playing Catchup, 445. 
20 Ibid., 446. 
21 Ibid. 
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Ordering firms from those performing functions most similar to a 
traditional military to the least, the classification is as follows: (1) Military 
Provider Firms; (2) Military Security or Defense Firms; (3) Military 
Intelligence Firms; (4) Military Consultant Firms; (5) Military Logistic 
Firms; and (6) Military Support Firms.22 
1. Military Provider Firms 
Military Provider Firms (MPFs) are the tactical force providers to the purchasing 
agent.  MPFs can operate distinctly on their own as a tactical combat force or can 
augment the capabilities of forces already on the ground. Additionally, MPFs can provide 
a tremendous amount of specialized resources, capable of being tailored to the missions’ 
demands.  This means that their services are highly desirable to even well-developed 
countries with significant military forces.  Perhaps the most notable MPF is the firm, 
Executive Outcomes (EO).  EO was founded in 1989 and is part of the Strategic 
Resources Corporation—a larger South African venture-capital firm.  EO is unique in 
two primary areas.  First, EO recruited almost exclusively from the standing South 
African Defence Force.  This provided a significant tactical advantage as recruits would 
arrive to EO with a similar foundation of tactics, techniques, and procedures and could 
thereby be seamlessly integrated into a cohesive fighting force.  In fact, EO was such a 
viable, ready-made combat force provider that, as Yasin observes, “[they] served as a 
total force provider in Sierra Leone in 1991.”  Second, EO operated under the corporate 
umbrella of a larger firm with myriad regional interests.  This was a symbiotic 
relationship, providing EO with substantial cover to elicit contracts beyond the reach of 
what should be expected from an MPF, while providing its parent organization a physical 
presence within areas of geopolitical interest. 
2. Military Security and Defense Firms 
Military Security and Defense Firms (MSDFs) may be the most highly publicized 
form of a PCMF and, in most instances, account for the tremendous amount of public 
concern regarding their actions.  Often referred to as Private Security Companies (PSCs), 
                                                 
22 Yasin, Playing Catch–Up, 446. 
 16
MSDFs are, primarily, defensive in nature but they have become so intertwined in U.S. 
force protection measures that they are sometimes difficult to distinguish from the armed 
forces.  Legal classification and regulations are perhaps the most ambiguous with this 
PCMF, and thus, the MSDF has garnered the lion’s share of scrutiny—perhaps none 
more so than the MSDF, Blackwater.23  Blackwater is a private corporation which began 
in 1998 in North Carolina.  Through a series of personal contacts, Blackwater’s founder, 
Eric Prince was able to generate substantial (and often, unprecedented) contracts at all 
levels—state, federal, and even international.  “In February, 2000, Blackwater won a 
General Services Administration (GSA) contract, which facilitated the U.S. government 
purchasing products or services from Blackwater without having to evaluate and accept 
bids on the competitive market.”24  Since 2001, this lucrative relationship has empowered 
Blackwater to expand exponentially in scope and influence, equating to a staggering 
growth rate of 80,453%.25 
3. Military Intelligence Firms 
Military Intelligence Firms (MIFs)26 provide the historically state-based function 
of intelligence procurement and analysis.  The emergence of the MIF is contentious at 
best, as the sensitive level of their services can easily trespass into a sovereign state’s 
domain.  But nonetheless, MIFs have emerged as a valuable commodity in areas of 
conflict and/or instability.  For example, during OEF and OIF, it swiftly became apparent 
that the U.S. intelligence structure would need substantial reforms and/or assistance to 
                                                 
23 For the purpose of continuity this company will be referred to throughout this thesis as Blackwater.  
It should be noted, however, that Blackwater has changed its name twice since 2007, first, to Xe and second 
(and currently), to Academi.  Popular speculation is that Blakwater did this to escape the stigma 
surrounding the company’s actions in Iraq in 2007.  See, Blackwater and Nisour Square. 
24 Yasin, Playing Catchup, 452 
25 Ibid. 
26 Yasin highlights that this category has not been distinguished from the other PCMFs by 
contemporary scholarship, as the procurement of intelligence has previously been considered the primary 
domain of states.  See Walter Pincus, Increase in Contracting Intelligence Jobs Raising Concerns, 
Washington Post, March 20, 2006.  Additionally, the sensitive nature of obtaining intelligence from 
individuals increases the potential to commit violations of human rights.  See War Profiteer of the Month: 
CACI, 23 War Profiteers’ News (April, 14, 2010), http://www.wri-irg.org/node/9927 (discussing the 
accountability of interrogators working for CACI as regards torturing detainees).  For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, MIFs will be a separate and thus, identifiable category of a PCMF.  
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operate effectively in the COIN environment.  MIFs helped fill the intelligence gap.  
CACI is just such a MIF.  CACI was formed in 1962, initially offering simulation 
software to its clients.  Like most PCMFs, CACI took advantage of the end of the Cold 
War and offered information technology to the federal government.  By 1998, CACI 
began acquiring several smaller intelligence firms, thus “becoming a premier provider of 
information technology services.”27  “In 2006, CACI was one of seven contractors 
chosen by the U.S. Army to provide technology and engineering services worth as much 
as $19 billion over a ten-year period.”28  This contract is alarming considering CACI’s 
involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal29—perhaps indicative of the reliance on their 
rather unique skill provisions. 
4. Military Consultant Firms 
Military Consultant Firms (MCFs) serve in, primarily, advisory roles without any 
direct involvement in combat operations alongside their client.  The distinguishing 
characteristic of MCFs from other PCMFs is that they are not physically present on the 
battlefield.  This, however, does not imply that their value is any less than those of other 
PCMFs.  On the contrary, MCFs are often considered the brain trust of the Private 
Military Industry and as such have an extensive amount of influence.  Military 
Professional Resources Incorporation (MPRI) is a prominent MCF.  Founded in 1978, 
MPRI has a proven track record as a partner of U.S. military endeavors.  MPRI has 
extensive ties to the highest levels of the U.S. government with over ninety-five percent 
of its employee pool having served in the U.S. Army.  “MPRI became invaluable in the 
mid-1990s for its strategic expertise in warfare in the former conflict-ridden 
Yugoslavia.”30 Owing, in large part to their success in Croatia, MPRI won a substantial 
contract with Bosnia regarding “combat training,” but the structure of the contract was 
                                                 
27 Yasin, Playing Catchup, 455. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The prisoner abuse scandal of Abu Ghraib, however damaging to the reputation of the United States 
also had reverberating effects throughout the privatized community.  CACI employees were directly linked 
to the scandal and, to some degree, were even considered to be acting in supervisory roles.  The 
significance of such a statement cannot be understated as it meant that civilians were in direct control over 
military personnel during combat related operations. 
30 Yasin, Playing Catchup, 458 
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somewhat of an anomaly—the Bosnian government received the military training but 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, Brunei, and the United Arab Emirates funded the 
payment.31  Currently, MPRI is heavily invested as a training/advisory force in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.32 
5. Military Logistics Firms 
Military Logistics Firms (MLFs) provide support unrelated to direct combat 
operations, such as transportation, mail delivery, cargo handling, and refueling.  
Ironically, while they serve in a supporting role, MLFs often travel into hostile areas to 
do so.  The largest provider of such functions is the MLF, Kellogg, Brown & Root 
(KBR).  Founded in 1919, this Texas-based firm has risen to prominence as the single, 
largest PCMF in American history.33  “In 1963, Halliburton, a global construction and 
energy services company, purchased KBR as a subsidiary corporation…[but] officially 
separated from KBR forty-four years later, in April of 2007.”34  Like Blackwater, KBR 
has been a center for controversy and scrutiny, but for a much longer time.  Over the past 
fifty years, KBR has had dubious relationships with senior U.S. government officials, 
ranging from President Lyndon B. Johnson to Vice President Dick Cheney. 
It is not too farfetched to conclude that KBR ran the U.S. operations in Iraq—at 
least logistically.  As Yasin succinctly states: 
Between 2003 and the summer of 2007, KBR had solidified over 
$20 billion in logistics and support contracts—a number roughly three 
times what the U.S. government paid to fight the entire 1991 Persian Gulf 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 460.  This setup reveals a very important issue with regard to PCMFs that the law has not 
fully addressed—the extent to which states can fund private militaries to perform tactical or combat 
operations that serve the funding states’ interests. 
32 The author has worked extensively with MPRI contractors in Iraq and has observed the evolution of 
a provincial-wide law enforcement training program designed to instruct Iraqi National Police how to 
conduct forensics and crime scene investigations in accordance with proven methods of accuracy.  The 
program known as Combined Law Enforcement Against Terrorism (CLEAT) was initiated by MPRI 
contractors in 2009 with measurable degrees of success, first in Ramadi and Fallujah, then throughout the 
entire Anbar Province. 
33 So much so that this thesis will address KBR, how it rose to prominence, and the causal effects their 
emergence had on the PMI as a whole, in Chapter II. 
34 Yasin, Playing Catchup,  461.   
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War.  On March 2, 2010, the government awarded another comprehensive 
logistics contract to KBR.”35 
6. Military Support Firms 
Military Support Firms (MSFs) are, by far, the largest of the six categories of 
PCMFs.  MSFs provide all the necessary, and usually large-scale, operations required to 
house significant numbers of U.S. military personnel.  Basic essential provisions like 
food services, laundry operations, construction/maintenance projects, and power 
generation are all the hallmark of MSFs.  KBR, again, is the prominent player here and is 
the largest support firm in Iraq.36 
The majority of scholarly works categorize MLFs and MSFs together,37 but this 
thesis seconds the recommendation of Huma Yasin—that separating the two is essential 
for effective legal reform.  This section contends this to be a reasonable objective since, 
unlike MLFs, MSFs reside and operate within the confines and security of military bases 




Although the history of the modern day PCMF is certainly significant to this 
thesis, the primary focus of the chapter was on PCMF classification.  Misidentifying 
PCMFs, or worse, applying blanket legalese to the entire industry not only fails to 
prevent fraud and abuse, it may actually encourage it. Without being able to succinctly 
determine which type of PCMF is performing what and for whom, current legal measures 
are simply irrelevant, making any realistic hopes of achieving PCMF accountability 
nearly impossible.  For this purpose, this chapter presented six sub-classifications to be 
retained for further debate during the advancement of the author’s hypothesis. 
                                                 
35 Yasin, Playing Catch Up, 462.  See, also Singer, Corporate Warriors, 247.   
36 Yasin, Playing Catchup,  463. 
37 I am thinking here of P.W. Singer, Dan Briody, Deborah Avant, et al. 
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III. PRESIDENTS, MOTIVES, AND PROFITS: HOW  
THE MODERN-DAY PCMF MAY HAVE BEEN  
BORN IN VIETNAM 
As we have seen in Chapter I, the use of private military institutions is nothing 
new.  Throughout the history of warfare kings, presidents, and prime ministers have 
found ways to employ at their respective discretions units of enforcers, guardians, and 
suppliers whose existence remained outside the scope of traditional military means.  This 
privatization of war has given the executive immense political latitude by providing him 
with a means to exercise force, provide additional support, or project influence into areas 
that otherwise may have been (at least politically) untenable.  Although this chapter 
builds on Chapter I—that the end of the Cold War contributed greatly to the rapid 
expansion of PCMFs—it proposes that the precedents set years earlier may have had 
greater significant impact than most modern PCMF related works recognize. 
Part one of this chapter will look to the Vietnam War, specifically, and present 
evidence that the issues, relationships, and decisions that accompanied it could accurately 
be considered the birthplace of the modern-day PCMF.  Part two presents two separate 
theoretical proposals.  First, that the “credibility gap” associated with President Johnson 
has re-emerged in modern times.  And second, that counterinsurgency, or COIN, (like 
PCMFs) began in earnest in Vietnam and that the same tactics that began there have been 
reapplied in the Middle East.  This not only sets the transition for Chapter III but also 
implies that the U.S. emphasis on COIN has exacerbated the proliferation of PCMFs. 
A. THE VIETNAM WAR—AN ATYPICAL CONFLICT 
The Vietnam War presented the United States with numerous political and 
military hurdles.  The conflict created immense emotional debate during and after the 
war.  But the political decisions—especially the decisions to utilize Private Military 
Companies in direct, supporting roles—were perhaps of even greater debate, as the 
decisions by presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, respectively, would be 
instrumental in determining the amount of influence that private military companies 
(PCMFs) would have on every future application of U.S. force projection.  For this 
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reason, this thesis will utilize the Vietnam War as a case study in order to determine the 
reasons that the aforementioned executives chose to utilize private military companies as 
combat multipliers across a very diverse spectrum. 
This chapter will begin with the assumption that, as a whole, the decision to 
employ contractors on the battlefield was necessary to solve the critical military problem 
of Vietnam—fighting an asymmetrical enemy operating in harsh geography. U.S. forces 
would need to re-evaluate the enemy, the environment, and their own methods to achieve 
success.  This dilemma was succinctly described by Stephen Rosen when he stated that 
U.S. senior military leaders knew they needed to know “how to adapt, quickly and 
successfully, to the peculiar and unfamiliar battlefield conditions in which our armed 
forces [were] fighting.”38  The research question is to determine not only why PCMFs 
were utilized during Vietnam, but how they became such an integral entity of sustained 
combat operations.  The relationship between civilian contractors and military operations 
may have risen from the personal relationships between the respective presidents (most 
notably Johnson) and senior civilian CEOs.  It is a difficult task, however, to form a clear 
causal link between positions of influence and lucrative investments.  As George Herring 
noted, possibly the “limited vision of the political and military leaders of the time”39 
made them incapable of adjusting to an adaptable enemy (the key component of Rosen’s 
argument), and so, they employed PCMFs out of desperation in order to provide 
maximum mobility to the military forces.   Another interpretive challenge is that 
effectively determining any quid pro quo between PCMFs and a Commander-in-Chief is 
speculative at best, as any substantial evidence to the contrary is, at first glance, 
ambiguous. 
This section presents four contributing factors that serve as causes for the 
utilization of PCMFs on an unprecedented level in Vietnam.  In chronological order, 
these factors (with the applicable Presidents listed in parentheses) are as follows: 1.) The 
Consistency Theory obligated the United States to perhaps unnecessary involvement in 
                                                 
38 Stephen Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security 7 
(Fall 1982): 83. 
39 George C. Herring, “Johnson Administration’s Limited War in Vietnam,” Looking Back on the 
Vietnam War: A 1990’s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies, eds. William Head and 
Lawrence E. Grinder (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993), 90. 
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Vietnam due to personal sentiments and professional courtesies (Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson), 2.) Unethical professional relationships strongly influenced presidential 
decisions (Johnson), 3.) An unprepared Congress displayed little proficiency in 
understanding, much less supervising, hastily contracted expenditures (Johnson), and  
4.) Often-damning public opinion, questioning the validity of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam, created an environment that was extremely open to exploitation (Johnson and 
Nixon). 
B. FOUR CAUSAL FACTORS AND THE PRECEDENTS THEY SET 
The Vietnam War ushered in a relatively new way of doing business.  Prior to this 
war, U.S. reliance on civilian support had been in a manner that kept the armed services 
active while keeping the providers largely out of harm’s way—at least directly.  
Contractors still performed the tasks necessary to support standing armies, but they did so 
in rear areas, mostly free from any direct enemy threat.40   In Vietnam, however, this 
tactic began to change.  In this conflict, more than any other time in U.S. history, soldiers 
and contractors worked side by side and shared the inherent dangers of active combat 
operations.   So prevalent was this relationship that Business Week referred to Vietnam as 
a “war by contract.”41 
As Robert Komer points out in Bureaucracy at War, “Vietnam presented a highly 
atypical conflict environment.”42  There were numerous cultural differences and socio-
political agendas, as well as military objectives, that were either wholly misunderstood or 
missed altogether.  It had the potential to become a quagmire and in retrospect has been 
labeled such.  But, just as it was an “atypical conflict environment,” it offered (from a 
purely contractual point of view) a unique perspective into the emergence and subsequent 
integration of PCMFs on the battlefield.  Considering what was pushing U.S. policy 
makers into this quagmire, the first causal factor is The Consistency Theory. 
 
                                                 
40 Zamparelli, “Competitive Sourcing,” 14. 
41 "Vietnam: How Business Fights the War on Contract," Business Week (5 March, 1965): 58–62. 
42 Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO. 
Westview Press, 1986), 2. 
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1. The Consistency Theory 
The consistency theory, in essence, suggests that each president was more than 
likely to continue with the programs, policies, and initiatives begun by his predecessor.  
This seems a logical assumption, because, at that time, stemming the expansion of 
communism was a high priority within the government of the United States.  President 
Eisenhower was adamant in his belief that if the U.S. failed to prevent communism from 
developing in politically fragile nation-states, it would have a domino effect on 
neighboring countries and/or those in similar conditions of political instability.  This 
strategic concept rendered U.S. military involvement an almost foregone conclusion.  The 
“domino theory articulated by President Eisenhower in 1954 set forth a worst-case 
scenario and guided strategic thinking thereafter,”43 Gary Hess observes.  Eisenhower, 
like Truman before him, felt that Vietnam was a target of Soviet and Chinese aggression 
and therefore (in keeping with the domino theory) was of immense, strategic importance 
to the U.S.44  As such, Eisenhower expanded the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) initially begun by Truman and sent to Vietnam in 1954.45 
Post WWII and fresh out of the Korean War, the United States held deep concerns 
regarding communist aggression.  But preventing the spread of communism meant 
positioning U.S. resources in global defense postures.  This course of action was a policy 
of containment and the consequences of such a policy were not lost on those within the 
Executive Branch.  The political intricacies of investing U.S. forces in far-reaching 
countries, compounded with the deeply held anti-communist sentiments, facilitate an 
understanding of why successive presidents chose, in large part, to continue the course of 
their respective predecessors. 
                                                 
43 Gary R. Hess, “South Vietnam Under Siege, 1961-1965: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Question of 
Escalation or Disengagement,” in David L. Anderson, ed., The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 146.  
44 David Anderson, Trapped by Success, The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1991), 18. 
45 History of the MAAG, accessed through Richmond University, 
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/MAAG.html.  The MAAG, although comprised of 
military personnel would advise and assist in training the Vietnamese forces.  The MAAG precedent would 
set the conditions for the rise of the PCMF, the Military Consultant Firm (MCF), See, MPRI, Chapter I.  
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Eisenhower pursued Truman’s goal, recognized at the end of the French 
Indochina War in 1954—the preservation of an independent, pro-Western government in 
South Vietnam.  This government would be an alternative to the communist model and 
would serve as a sentinel in the region, steadfast against communist aggression.  Such a 
regime would divide the country, but this outcome was a plausible option for the 
Eisenhower administration as similar precedents had already been set in West Germany 
and South Korea.  “The Eisenhower years saw the development of a large and multi-
faceted advisory role. Several U.S. government agencies became involved, including 
defense and state departments, and private international agencies engaged in 
humanitarian assistance.”46 But Eisenhower’s methods were slow and methodical and 
offered few tangible examples of success.  In fact, the Eisenhower administration seemed 
to drag its political feet in Vietnam, perhaps in hope that the issue would reach better 
resolution and thus, provide more viable options under the coming presidential watch of 
John F. Kennedy.  Or maybe Eisenhower never fully grasped the situation in Vietnam 
and so chose the politically safest course of action—to invest the bare minimum of U.S. 
support.  Regardless of whether Eisenhower purposefully postponed decisions on 
Vietnam or if he was simply politically ignorant to the area’s regional turbulence, the 
onus of the problem was going to fall on Kennedy’s presidency.  The irony of 
Eisenhower’s lack of any substantial actions and/or decisions compounded with his 
administrations’ self-proclaimed success would make this responsibility even more 
daunting.  David Anderson states this succinctly in the following: 
By 1961 the goal of buying time had been achieved.  The Saigon regime had 
stood for over six years, but South Vietnam was not a viable nation and was not 
becoming one.  The objective of an independent South Vietnam was proving increasingly 
unrealistic and unachievable without greater cost and risk to the United States.  With its 
proclivity to perceive and proclaim success where, in fact, failure abounded, the 
Eisenhower administration trapped itself and its successors into a commitment to the 
survival of its own counterfeit creation.47 
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In 1961, John F. Kennedy assumed the office of the president and with it, the 
residual obligations of his predecessor.  The fear of communist aggression coming from 
Moscow and Beijing was still prevalent in main stream America, and yet there was 
substantial apprehension regarding the potential measures required to deter it.  President 
Kennedy held similar personal concerns about communist expansion, so his desire to 
remain faithful to a containment policy seems reasonable. 
Remaining relatively loyal to a predecessor’s policies has been a historically safe 
course of action.  The abandonment of established norms and policies has seldom been 
seen as a way to preserve political office—unless these policies clearly demanded 
immediate change. So from a sheer professional point of view, it stands to reason that 
with regard to Vietnam, Kennedy would continue along a decisional path similar to 
Eisenhower’s.  Accordingly, Kennedy was reluctant to make any decisively aggressive 
moves in the region, but yet he understood the consequences of inaction. 
At the time of Kennedy’s inauguration, Viet Cong attacks in South Vietnam had 
become more frequent and of greater intensity.  Compounding this threat was the almost 
immediate recognition that the southern forces were not adequately trained to repel 
(much less defeat) such aggression.48 President Kennedy supposedly understood the 
insurgency threat better than Eisenhower and realized that a true defeat of communist 
aggression in the area would require not only “a military victory, but socioeconomic, 
political, and psychological victories as well.”49  Kennedy’s response to the growing 
instability began to take a more robust military shape, but, still his approach was not that 
far removed from Eisenhower’s.  By maintaining a posture of containment, Kennedy 
remained committed to the policy of the previous administration.  His methods however, 
would be more direct. 
Kennedy saw special operations forces (SOF) as an essential tool in achieving 
success in the area. Although not requiring as large a logistical support network as 
conventional forces, SOF still needed unique reach-back capabilities best supported by 
PCMFs.  This course of action facilitated force projection while the utilization of PCMFs 
                                                 
48 “Vietnam and Its Wars: A Historical Overview of U.S. Involvement,” Looking Back on the Vietnam 
War, ed. William Head and Lawrence Grinter (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 25.  
49 Ibid. 
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in support provided discretion.  By 1963, this vision would become strategy and perhaps 
more importantly, would frame many significant options and precedents for his 
successors.  Kennedy was now committed to Vietnam, inextricably tied to its outcome 
through moral obligations and professional courtesy.  By 1963, he had seen the turmoil in 
the area increase with violence and unpredictability.  Coup attempts and civil discord 
were confronting U.S. forces there, and the expected responses required to mitigate 
further escalation were increasingly becoming less and less desirable.  It is unknown, 
however, how Kennedy would have ultimately responded to the changing dynamics had 
his presidency not been cut short by an assassin’s bullet.50 
The assassination of President Kennedy did not change the fact that Vietnam 
remained an unanswered dilemma for the United States and that the instability in the 
South remained a strategic concern.  Kennedy had reluctantly continued the policy of 
containment but had chosen rather unique methods—mainly the application of special 
operations forces.  Lyndon Johnson also remained consistent with the previous 
administration’s commitment to Vietnam, but he had bolder plans for a solution.  His 
decisions, unlike his predecessors, seemed driven by events beyond strategic 
assessments.  Johnson’s sense of urgency leads to a second causal factor, and perhaps the 
strongest one, in explaining why PCMFs emerged in earnest in Vietnam—that 
personalities, political favors, and informal business relationships strongly influenced 
presidential decisions. 
2. Unethical, Professional Relationships 
If the consistency theory explains the continuum of policies through informal and 
formal measures of influence, then personalities and informal business practices could 
best explain presidential decisions made often in direct opposition to previously accepted 
methods.  This factor most strongly represents the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. 
When Johnson became President, Robert Caro notes, “the number of American 
troops—advisors, not combatants—in Vietnam was 16,000,” and public interest was still 
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relatively small.51  Johnson, like Kennedy, seemed poised to continue with the 
consistency theory when he pledged no wider war.  But Johnson’s actions were in direct 
opposition to his words, and by 1966—only a little over two years after his 
inauguration—there were 385,000 U.S. troops involved in the conflict.  In fact, in 
perhaps the most telling statistic, Caro points out that “by the end of 1966, more 
Americans had died in Vietnam than had been in Vietnam when Johnson became 
President.”52  Such a tremendous separation between deeds and words framed Johnson’s 
presidency and brought to light the lengths that he would take to preserve (or more 
accurately, improve) his political position. 
Caro describes Johnson as a “genius in the art of politics,”53 and his Means of 
Ascent offers a detailed critique into Johnson’s deft political maneuverings and back-road 
Texas business deals.  Johnson used whatever means necessary to gain advantages, to 
defeat political rivals, and to return financial favors.  Often times these dealings stirred 
significant questions from the media about Johnson’s ethical decision making and 
business practices.  Seemingly, however, Johnson was always able to quell these doubts 
through various means of influence.  Perhaps no source of influence in the Johnson camp 
was greater than that wielded by Brown & Root, a giant in the Texas construction 
business.  Caro’s work provides a substantial account of this influence and of Johnson’s 
personal relationship with the Brown Brothers—Herman and George—owners and 
operators of Brown & Root. 
Caro reports that Brown & Root “had lavishly poured money into his [Johnson’s] 
campaigns” and had become the single largest financial contributor throughout LBJ’s 
political career.54  The Brown brothers donated “hundreds of thousands of dollars” to 
Johnson’s campaigns, beginning with his aspirations to become a member of the House 
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of Representatives and culminating with his rise to the presidency.  In return, Johnson 
made Brown & Root wealthy.  This quid pro quo relationship was undoubtedly critical to 
Johnson’s political campaign successes and gave a private company unlimited access to, 
and unprecedented influence over, the President of the United States.  Caro sums this up 
best in the following: 
Through federal contracts, Johnson had made (Herman) Brown rich, and 
given him the chance to build the huge projects of which he had long 
dreamed, and Brown had ordered up contributions from dozens of 
subcontractors on Brown & Root dams and highways and had, in giving 
from his own firm’s coffers, gone to the edge of the law, and some 
Internal Revenue Service agents were later to contend, over that edge into 
the realm of fraud in order to finance Lyndon Johnson’s ambition.55 
The two Texas entities—Brown & Root and Lyndon Johnson—were inextricably 
linked, each one recognizing the value of the other.  An example of this recognition can 
be seen from Johnson’s decision on whether or not to run for the Senate in 1942.  
“Herman’s younger brother George delivered to Johnson his brother’s pledge: if Lyndon 
wanted to run in 1942, the money would be available again—all that was needed.”56 
The influence of Brown & Root upon Johnson’s early political career was indisputable 
and its influence continued throughout his presidency despite Johnson’s claims to the 
contrary.57  George Brown became a trusted confidante of LBJ, and “whenever Brown 
visited Washington, Johnson made the suave contractor part of the inner circle.”58   
Brown & Root, having financed Johnson from the 1940s and into his election as 
Vice President, was rewarded after Kennedy’s assassination with lucrative contracts in 
the escalating Vietnam War. Business journalist Dan Briody has written: “Johnson, who 
became president in 1963 after Kennedy’s assassination and who was elected with broad 
support in 1964, used the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in order to justify the sending of 
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ground troops into Vietnam. The result of that move was the need for billions of dollars’ 
worth of bases, airstrips, ports, and bridges.  Enter Brown & Root.”59 
In 1965, a year after Johnson stepped up America’s participation in Vietnam, 
Brown & Root joined three other construction and project management behemoths, 
Raymond International, Morris-Knudsen, and J.A. Jones to form one of the largest 
civilian-based military construction conglomerates in history.  That team of corporations 
“literally changed the face of Vietnam, clearing out wide swaths of jungle for airplane 
landing strips, dredging channels for ships, and building American bases from Da Nang 
to Saigon.”60 
The nature of LBJ’s relationship to Brown & Root can best be described in one 
word: corrupt.  Magnifying this corruption were LBJ’s deceptive intentions and his 
dominating personality.  Johnson was a man who believed that he had to deter 
communism in Southeast Asia while advancing his ultimate goal of a Great Society.  To 
do this he needed to convince the American public of one thing while doing something 
altogether different.  This sleight of hand would come to be known as Johnson’s 
“credibility gap”—a politically correct term for Johnson’s deceitfulness.  The credibility 
gap underlines an even larger deceit, which was Johnson’s personal relationship with 
Brown & Root and the financial favors he owed them.  As Jeffrey Helsing points out: 
“Just as the American public and Congress were deceived, so too, were the domestic and 
economic planners in Johnson’s administration kept in the dark about … Vietnam.”61  
This pattern of deceit contributed to the third causal argument—that Congress seemed 
unprepared to effectively question, much less counter, Johnson’s actions, perhaps, 
because, arguably, Congress had little proficiency in understanding, much less 
supervising, hastily contracted PCMFs within a theater of war on such a large scale. 
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3. An Unprepared Congress 
Confident politician that he was, Johnson knew that to succeed both abroad and 
domestically, he would need to wage war with unprecedented tools.  Meanwhile, Brown 
& Root, always eager to earn a profit, was more than willing to offer up its services in 
support of the war.  Brown & Root had capabilities beyond that of the current military 
and more importantly, by employing them in theater, Johnson would free up critical 
military manpower necessary for the task of war fighting.  By steering lucrative 
construction contracts towards George Brown, Johnson was able to swiftly and decisively 
establish the necessary logistical requirements of a long-term military engagement while 
being able to publicly profess support for the American servicemen in Vietnam—a 
method that put unavoidable pressure on Congress (at least initially) to allocate and 
apportion funds. 
Congress was ill-prepared to oversee Johnson’s ability to mobilize swiftly the 
support of Brown & Root, largely due to the close personal nature Johnson held with the 
company.  Although there is historical evidence of war profiteering by only a select few 
companies, it is hard to determine whether this occurred through the same personal 
interactions as exhibited by Johnson and Brown & Root.62 
Additionally, the impacts that emerged PCMFs (like Brown & Root) had on the 
budget were significant as increases in military spending were much higher than 
expected.63  As economist Murray Weidenbaum noted, “The Government would increase 
its orders in September, October, November of 1965, no reflection whatsoever in any 
current budget, but those orders were obviously immediately escalating the economy.”64  
                                                 
62 Several works exist that discuss companies gaining substantial profit from war-time contracts.  For 
example David Kennedy in Freedom from Fear, states: “in WWII, General Motors had one-tenth of all war 
production, two-thirds of all prime contracts went to only one hundred companies, and  thirty three of the 
largest corporations had one-half of all contracts.” David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American 
People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 621-22.  This 
implies that the big corporations were able to position themselves to reap the biggest benefits.  The “rich 
get richer” sentiment is echoed by R. Elberton Smith in The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington 
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), passim.  This thesis contends 
that although a select percentage of large companies have certainly benefited from war none seem to have 
done so from the almost untraceable, direct personal arrangements established by Johnson. 
63 Helsing, Johnson’s War, 193. 
64 Murray Weidenbaum, testimony during Joint Economic Committee Hearings on The Economic 
Effect of Vietnam Spending, April 27, 1967, 184, quoted in Helsing, Johnson’s War, 193. 
 32
Weidenbaum noted, “that a key factor to watch was new obligations, which includes both 
government payrolls and contracts with private firms:”65 “The actual amount of new 
obligations incurred during fiscal year 1966 was somewhat in excess of $67 billion or 
almost one-fourth greater than in 1965.  Actual expenditures increased at a much slower 
rate during the same period—17 percent.  In other words, obligations are the more 
sensitive lead indicator.”66 
The fact that Congress seemed to be unaware and, more specifically, unwilling to 
confront Johnson’s political intentions created an environment conducive to the personal 
whims of the president and the financial aspirations of Brown & Root and other private 
military companies it helped to bring along.  To make matters worse, public sentiment 
was becoming increasingly hostile towards U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  Protests began 
to surface with increasing regularity questioning why American forces were there.  
Congress was becoming entangled with moral sentiments, constitutional entitlements, 
and its legislative authorities.67 Consequently, the fourth and final causal variable—that 
often damning public opinion caused U.S. leaders to operate with political recklessness. 
4. Public Opinion 
Public opinion, seemingly inconsequential to Johnson’s motives during the initial 
phase of his presidency, had taken a heavy toll.  And as Johnson’s presidency limped 
towards its inglorious end, what to do with Vietnam became the primary campaign topic 
in 1968.  Republican candidate Richard Nixon pledged to withdraw American forces 
from Vietnam through a policy he eventually called “Vietnamization”—a process that 
would put Vietnamese officials in the lead in developing and maintaining their own 
government infrastructure and means of security.  But Nixon, much like his predecessor, 
was very adept in deception and knew that the policy of Vietnamization was intended to 
sway public opinion in support of his administration.  Nixon knew that, in reality, to 
succeed where others had failed he would have to drastically (recklessly, in some 
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regards) increase the aggressive perception and resolve of the United States.  Nixon 
professed a “madman theory” in the hopes that he would convince the Northern 
communist leaders that he was wholly unpredictable and that he considered the utilization 
of nuclear weapons as a viable option.68 
Ironically, the public decree of seeking Vietnamization while privately conveying 
a madman persona to communist leaders set the conditions for a continuance of 
profiteering by the private military companies.  George Brown no longer had a well-
compensated ally in the Oval Office, but his company had grown immensely, and its 
contributions to the Vietnam War—at least logistically—were intrinsically tied to the 
force projection capabilities of all manner of combat forces.  Air strips, bases, roads, 
supply points, etc., were all critical nodes in military missions that would facilitate 
Nixon’s madman approach.  Additionally, the technical expertise required to operate 
efficiently could not be guaranteed without the likes of General Dynamics and other large 
companies.  Hostile public (and, now, congressional) opinion encouraged Nixon to rely 
privately on the assets and capabilities of the private military companies in theater.69 
Nixon’s public deceit declaring that the Vietnamese will determine their own 
future—but privately waging aggressive military operations may have in actuality 
prolonged the war.70  Ironically, by prolonging U.S. involvement—and in some regards 
altogether increasing it—Nixon may have inadvertently made the rise and subsequent 
role of the PCMF much more lucrative than it had been.  Further, the precedents set by 
Johnson and Nixon during the Vietnam War potentially revealed how much influence 
PCMFs can have on presidential decisions. 
The previous section presented evidence that the issues, conditions, and decisions 
made during the Vietnam era may have set significant precedents regarding PCMF 
utilization.  Although Vietnam was indeed an atypical conflict, this section argues that 
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that was only in the historical sense.  Vietnam ushered in the asymmetrical threat and all 
the ambiguity that comes with it.  Fighting no clearly defined belligerent with fluctuating 
objectives in the midst of opaque presidential motives would, in this author’s opinion, set 
the conditions for PCMF exploitation some forty years later. 
C. EXPANDING THE “CREDIBILITY GAP”:  FROM LBJ TO TODAY 
The credibility gap mentioned earlier in this chapter was indicative of President 
Johnson’s powerful public persona mixed with his personal belief in his own infallibility.  
But the credibility gap did not end with Johnson’s administration.  Over the last ten years, 
the demands of OIF and OEF have certainly generated their own credibility concerns, 
e.g., accusations of favoritism and profiteering certainly surrounded Vice President 
Cheney and his ties to Halliburton.  The military has  not been immune either, as its 
lucrative contracts to all manner of PCMFs seemed to reveal a system in which the 
military was far too closely connected to forces many considered nothing more than 
mercenaries.  The former accusation was (and still is) never far removed from discussion 
about the Bush Administration, while the latter was and is still hotly debated.  This 
section will focus on the latter contention and will provide reasons why the manner in 
which the U.S. has chosen to fight, i.e., COIN, has produced an inescapable environment 
conducive to privatized exploitation. 
1. The Unfortunate “Truisms”71 of COIN 
America did not win in Vietnam because the U.S. faced an opponent who fought 
an asymmetrical war—combining conventional methods with unconventional ones.  The 
Vietnamese RVN and the VC frustrated the endeavors of American combat forces.  Now, 
similar methods are being employed in Afghanistan and were, just recently, used 
successfully by insurgents in Iraq.  The difficulty in fighting an asymmetrical war comes 
in not just understanding who your enemy is but why he has chosen to engage you.  
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Without fully grasping the operational environment, the former becomes difficult, the 
latter, impossible.  For this reason, Counterinsurgency, or COIN, became the method of 
choice for U.S. ground forces during Vietnam and later, OIF and OEF.  COIN implies 
that understanding the enemy is key, but leveraging support of his surrounding 
population, essential.  By winning the population—commonly referred to as “winning the 
hearts and minds,” the enemy is denied safe-haven and thus, rendered combat ineffective. 
Winning hearts and minds is accomplished through various civil affairs initiatives aimed 
at establishing or, where applicable, improving basic humanitarian needs.  As these needs 
are met, the initiatives follow along a progressive evolution, becoming more complex 
until all basic requirements of a functioning community can be met72—at least with 
enough integrity to operate their basic functions. These seem reasonable to accomplish, in 
theory, but in practice have become so misunderstood and misallocated that seldom is a 
sequential path established.  Far too often, an immediate jump from basic needs to 
building a complex, networked infrastructure has occurred.  Tactically, this is a tragedy, 
as the complex initiatives will seldom see completion while more pressing needs are 
ignored.  This is especially true in austere regions of Afghanistan and Iraq, where local, 
tribally–based communities simply need basic necessities like food and water but instead 
are far too often promised loftier initiatives.  Power grids and school systems are 
important, yes.  But their completion runs secondary to basic humanitarian supplies.  To 
make matters worse, if these lofty objectives are not completed, or are done so in shoddy 
fashion, it can actually damage any fledgling relationship and turn the local population 
against the Americans; fostering a belief that the Westerners cannot meet their own 
promises, or worse, that they refuse to see the populations’ plight.   
This section does not mean to imply that COIN is a useless approach, but it does 
suggest that it is a fallible one.  In the U.S. military’s rush to push the benefits of a COIN 
campaign, they have created a system that rewards a high operational tempo with swift 
results, but unfortunately, implies unrealistic expectations.  The machination of this 
behavior is easy to identify in U.S. forces that are operating (deployed) on a finite 
timeline, as tangible results equal operational relevance. 
                                                 
72 See, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 
 36
COIN is not social-engineering, but it can be mistaken for such when misapplied.  
It is an applicable tool, but like all tools it has its place.  Utilizing COIN tactics in areas 
that are not fully understood can have unintended consequences.  It is imperative that all 
leaders understand that COIN is not a universal method and should not be considered as 
the default alternative when entering into a new environment.  Across the board, military 
leaders should not be entering into discussions with an open wallet.  This erodes respect, 
fosters corruption, and may, in the long run, create dependencies where none existed.  
This complete inability (or refusal) to grasp the concept that infusing an operational 
environment with U.S. money and energy before fully understanding it may be doing 
more harm than good.  But this lack of judgment is not wholly the fault of the military.  
Agencies such as the DoS, USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and 
various types of NGOs, often fail to assist in synchronizing their efforts. Worse still, 
some or all of these entities have proven guilty of funding projects that do not seem in 
accordance with a population’s needs.  Thankfully, these are exceptions and not the rule, 
but the truth is, it does not take a lot of exceptions for a local population to feel that the 
U.S. is operating in its own best interests.  This, ultimately, helps an enemy continuously 
recruit from a population that sees American initiatives sorely out of touch with Arab 
culture. 
Furthermore, the “truisms” of COIN are just as overly abused by today’s 
politicians as they were during the Vietnam era.  For example, often quoted phrases like 
“the situation is delicate, but improving,” or, the fate of the [Vietnamese/Iraqis/Afghanis] 
will be decided by them not us,” to “we are turning the corner, but there is more work to 
be done,” all say something without saying anything—speaking in “truisms” rather than 
the truth.  COIN by its very nature, provides politicians with ample wiggle room since, 
unlike the stark contrast of battling belligerents, it focuses on the entirely gray area of 
civic improvements and strategic partnerships.  The latitude that COIN provides 
politicians and senior military commanders alike is unfortunate because it does not 
effectively hold them to task, since the task is never clearly understood. 
The fallacy of COIN is that it is purposefully ambiguous in both direction and 
intent.  Such an opaque operational environment, with agencies across the board 
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operating disjointedly and with no definitive objective, is ripe for exploitation by the 
PMI.  PCMFs will naturally want to capitalize on the legal ambiguity and operational 
confusion, providing profitable services either wholly outside military expertise, i.e., 
civil-construction efforts, or as an augmenting entity during political discourse.  Either 
way, ironically, the U.S.’s insistence on following a controversial method of “fighting” 
seems destined to continue a course of lucrative contracts and skeptical motives. 




Vietnam was certainly an atypical conflict, and it presented several prominent 
world leaders with an interesting array of political, military, religious, and socio-
economic quandaries that have been thoroughly dissected by scholars in the field.  This 
chapter has advanced a relatively new topic, on which there is still scant literature, and 
concludes that the rise of privately contracted military firms—at least as we know them 
today—began in earnest in Vietnam.  Two separate sections were devoted to this cause.  
In the first section, four causal variables were presented for why the Vietnam War was 
the catalyst for PCMF influence and integration.  First, the consistency theory presented 
the conditions for Kennedy and Johnson to continue the containment policy credited to 
President Eisenhower, and thus began perhaps an unavoidable course of escalation.  
Second, the unethical professional relationships of President Johnson spawned the 
tremendous influence of Brown & Root and made privatizing elements of war fighting 
extremely lucrative for logistically and technically specialized companies (as well as for 
politically savvy businessmen).  Third, an unprepared Congress encouraged a vicious 
cycle of funding, distributing lucrative contracts to elements that the legislative branch 
did not have the proficiency to oversee.  And fourth, a growingly hostile U.S. public 
opinion regarding Vietnam encouraged the administrations of the era to continue force 




one of these four factors could feasibly justify the emergence of PCMFs, but when 
viewed together, these four causal variables produce an environment that is ripe for 
exploitation. 
In the second section, this chapter proposes that the same “credibility gap” that 
plagued Johnson’s legacy resurfaced during the Bush Administration since scrutiny and 
skepticism still surround VP Cheney and Halliburton as well as the massive amount of 
contracts awarded to controversial PCMFs, e.g., Blackwater.  The chapter concludes with 
a theoretical discussion of COIN, tying the origin of modern-day COIN to 
“Vietnamization” and highlighting the fact that the U.S.’s reliance on COIN may be 
fostering a reliance on PCMFs.  This sets the conditions for Chapter III—the case study 







IV. THE UNITED STATES AND PCMFS IN MODERN 
WARFARE—CASE STUDY:  
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
Iraq presents an opportunity of a lifetime.73 
Privatized services have always been vital to the U.S. military’s ability to project 
farther, faster, and for sustained durations, to a greater extent than that of their enemies.  
This is perhaps to be expected from an industrialized nation with a capitalist economy.  
But, as we saw in the preceding chapter, Vietnam pushed the civilian sector’s relationship 
with the military into one of intrinsic commitment.  The profits obtained by both 
communities (military and privatized) were simply too lucrative to abandon.  For the next 
several decades, PCMFs would continue to emerge, finding their own niche in the 
contracting network.  This network had substantial influence domestically but its global 
reach was still maturing.  It would take an expansive, international event to really get the 
ball rolling.  Enter the end of the Cold War.  When the Soviet Union collapsed, the  
contracting network expanded exponentially as satellite countries of the former Soviet 
Regime instantly needed almost all conceivable forms of customizable, tactical and 
operational, civil-military support.   PCMFs were able to meet these needs, and thus 
continued to grow, both in number and capabilities, and to establish firm footholds in the 
international market. 
Between the 1990s and the early 2000s PCMFs, although distinguishable by 
services provided, had, collectively, grown into a formidable force.  By 2001, PCMFs 
numbered in the hundreds74 and their growth showed no signs of slowing down.  It is 
difficult to ascertain any singular reason for PCMF growth during this period.  Although, 
certainly, Post-Cold War opportunities played a role, so too did domestic, federal job 
                                                 
73 Rahman Saifur, “Call to Take Advantage of Opportunities in Iraq,” Gulf News (Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates), April 21, 2004.  Quoted in Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater, 219. 
74 This is subjective, at best, as there is no agency or organization responsible for keeping track of the 
numbers of PCMFs. 
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reductions, as well as a drawdown in U.S. armed forces.75  If, like most scholarly work, 
we recognize that a confluence of conditions drove PCMF growth,76 then a second 
expansive event would place it into overdrive.  Enter, September 11, 2001. 
Nine-eleven (9/11) was (and still is) a polarizing event.  Although occurring on 
U.S. soil, the event would have global impact.  The U.S. declared a named enemy—Al 
Qaeda, and a named threat—terrorism.  The new “war on terror” would be fought with 
every measure at U.S. disposal.  PCMFs would not only be necessary in this war, but 
essential, as America’s projection into Afghanistan, followed by Iraq, would need to be 
swift and decisive with the ability to sustain U.S. endeavors indefinitely. 
This chapter will focus on the latter of these two wars—Iraq, up to and including 
2011—and will offer evidence as to the applicability and necessity of the PCMFs 
operating there.  The chapter is divided into two parts.  Part one will present statistical 
data on the makeup and dispersion of PCMFs in theater, focusing on a macro view of 
civilian-military operations and tactical compatibility.  Presenting evidence that fighting a 
war without PCMF assistance is now inconceivable.   Part two will note the necessities of 
PCMFs but demonstrate that contractors in Iraq became a polarizing issue, testing the 
boundaries of civil-military relations.  This will be supported through the dissection of 
particular type of PCMF, and the one which seems the most controversial, i.e., the 
MSDF—commonly referred to as the Private Security Company, or PSC. 
A. USE OF PCMFS IN THEATER 
It had started small, a byproduct of all the mistakes at the beginning: not 
enough troops, ignoring the insurgency, starting reconstruction 
prematurely.  Soon they were everywhere: guarding the diplomats, the 
generals, military bases the size of small cities, and thousands of supply 
convoys filled with guns and ammunition and food.  Suddenly no one and 
no thing could move around Iraq without them.  Some human rights 
groups had mercs [mercenaries].  The media had mercs.  The International 
                                                 
75 From 1990-1997 the U.S. military reduced its total manpower from 2,043,705 to 1,438,562, 
“Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1990,” AD-A235 849, Washington Headquarters Services, 
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense.  Data for 1997 is available at 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/tab9. 
76 I am thinking here of Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau’s description of “a diverse set of drivers,” 
“Contracting Out Security,” Paper written for Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. (2011), 8. 
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Republican Institute, chaired by John McCain, and the National 
Democratic Institute, chaired by Madeleine Albright, used mercs to spread 
democracy.  The Iraqi politicians had them full time and the American 
politicians had them whenever came through to find out how the war was 
going.  The market was so hot it became known as the “Iraq Bubble.”  The 
demand to be safe never stopped, so neither did the supply.  The mercs 
came from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, from small-town police 
departments and the LAPD.  And form other nations’ armies: the British 
SAS, the Australian Defence Forces, the Nepalese Gurkhas.  One Peruvian 
I met swore that there were ex-members of the Shining Path in Iraq, the 
terrorists who massacred thusands of peasants during the eighties and 
nineties.  Terrorists fighting terrorists.77 
PCMFs would flourish in Iraq for a number of reasons but the foundation for their 
expansion there would be based on the initial lack U.S. troops.  With troops already 
committed to Afghanistan, the Army was stretched thin.  DoD was forced to look for 
ways to increase combat related specialties without reinstituting the draft.  PCMFs not 
only filled the gaps, they also came at significantly lower political costs, as the 
Administration could utilize them without affecting public opinion—at least not to the 
same degree as calling for more soldiers.  PCMFs were expected to provide substantial 
enhancement while mitigating public perception.  What was unexpected however, was 
the absolute reliance that the U.S. government would come to have on PCMF provisions. 
The United States has used contractors quite extensively during previous military 
operations, as already evidenced in the two previous chapters, but the ratio between 
contractors and members of the armed services in Iraq is roughly 2.5 times higher than 
any other major conflict.78  This disparity in ratio remained relatively constant throughout 
the Iraq War, even during the troop surge of 2007, to the drawdown of troops beginning 
in 2009 (see Figure 1).79  Interestingly, “according to DOD, as of March 2011, there were  
 
 
                                                 
77 Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq (Philiadelphia, PA: De Capo 
Press, 2008), 22-23. 
78 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, 
1. 
79 Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2011 Background and Analysis, 
accessed through http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.  
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approximately 64,000 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq compared to 46,000 uniformed 
personnel in-country.  Contractors made up approximately 58% of DOD’s workforce in 
Iraq.”80 
 
Figure 1.   Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq vs. Troop Levels (From 
Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background 
and Analysis, 2011). 
Contracted security often gets the lion’s share of attention—mainly due to the 
mercenary stigma—but, in reality, the MLFs and MSFs (identified in Chapter I) are, in 
number, the predominate source of contractors in Iraq, require the largest portion of the 
budget, and perform a range of services so diverse and so specialized that the military 
quite frankly cannot operate without them.  “As of March 2011, approximately 39,000 
                                                 
80 Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2011 Background and Analysis, 
accessed through http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.  
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personnel (61% of contractors) performed base support functions such as maintaining the 
grounds, running dining facilities, and performing laundry services (see Figure 8). 
Security was the second most common service provided, with approximately 10,500 
personnel (16% of contractors).  Combined, these two categories accounted for almost 
80% of DOD contractors in Iraq”81 (see Figure 2).82 
 
 
Figure 2.   Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Type of Service Provided                          
(As of March, 2011), (From Department of Defense Contractors in 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
81 DoD, Contractors, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. 
82 Ibid. 
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The relationship between PCMFs and the DoD has become so intertwined that 
ratio of PCMFs to troops on the ground is directly related to the current mission of the 
armed services.  For example, in a 2009 report on contractors in Iraq, The Department of 
Defense stated that: 
As the overall number of troops in Iraq has decreased, so too has the 
overall number of contractors.  For example, since June 2008, as troop 
levels dropped by approximately 108,000 (70%), total contractors fell by 
approximately 95,000 (60%).  However, the number of contractors did not 
decrease uniformly across the contractor workforce.  For example, during 
the same period, contractors providing base support and construction 
declined by 57% (51,000 personnel) and 98% (35,000 personnel) 
respectively, whereas the number of contractors providing security 
actually increased by 14% (1,000 personnel).  This data indicates that as 
the services required by DOD change during the course of operations, the 
percentages and numbers of contractors providing different types of 
services also change.  The drop in the number of contractor personnel 
performing base support and construction is a reflection of DOD’s 
shrinking footprint and winding down of reconstruction activities.  The 
percentage of contractors performing base support has remained relatively 
constant, the percentage working in construction has decreased, and the 
percentage performing security has increased.83 
 
A separate but interesting point of observation is the low numbers of local nationals 
hired as contractors in Iraq, despite the emphasis by senior leaders to do otherwise.84  
This seems counterintuitive to the prospects of COIN, in that the local population seems 
separated from the prospects of being rewarded contracts that would ease economic 
hardship—at least in isolated fashion.  The evidence presented in Table 2 runs corollary 
to the author’s theory presented in Chapter II, i.e., without a full understanding of how to 
employ COIN tactics, the wrong target population may benefit, making the operational 




                                                 
83 DoD, Contractors in Iraq, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf 
84 General Raymond T. Odierno, Memorandum, Increased Employment of Iraq Citizens Through 
Command Contracts, Multi-National Force-Iraq, January 31, 2009. 
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Table 2.   Contractor Personnel in Iraq (as of March, 2011) (From Department of 




Wars are never cheap—whether in lives, resources, or capital, and OIF was no 
exception.  The numbers of personnel listed throughout the preceding figures and tables 
are indicative of an unprecedented amount of financial capital, especially considering that 
contracting out through privatized companies cost an exceptional percentage of the 
overall budget.  DOD obligated approximately $15.4 billion on contracts in the Iraq 
Theater of operations in FY2010, representing 20% of total spending in those regions.85  
From FY2005 to FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $112.8 billion on contracts 
primarily in the Iraq Theater of operations, representing 19% of total obligations for 
operations in Iraq.86 
1. Supporting or Eroding U.S. Forces? 
The Military Industrial Complex that Eisenhower warned about is now in full 
effect.  Privatization of military-centric provisions is such an integral part of how the U.S. 
goes to war today that outsourcing services goes largely unnoticed.   Through conditions, 
precedents, and opportunities, PCMFs have established a niche for themselves as an 
unavoidable necessity and there seems to be no end in sight.  To make matter worse—or 
better, depending on your point of view—PCMFs have the luxury of recruiting from a 
virtually limitless pool.  The symbiotic relationship between PCMFs and the military  
 
                                                 
85 Based on total obligations of $76.6 billion. Data includes total war-related obligations by year incurred 
(with classified request based on appropriations), based on data provided by the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service. Classified appropriations allocated 60% to Iraq operations and 40% to Afghanistan 
operations. See CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 
Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. 
86 Ibid. Based on total obligations of $588.6 billion. The percentage of contract expenditures for operations 
in Iraq from FY2005 through FY2010 were 24%, 23%, 15%,17%, 20%, and 20%, respectively.  
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means that military members are routinely exposed to the pay and benefits bestowed 
upon U.S. contractors.  This is often an enticing incentive for those seeking post-military 
careers.87 
In addition to highly competitive pay, contractors are not held to the same 
standards of the military.  There are no set rules of behavior outside what may be 
stipulated in the contract, and punitive measures are rarely as severe as those enacted 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 88 This can be another enticing 
factor and encourages a departure from the military ranks.  Furthermore, contractors 
have, by design, an exceptional amount of latitude to carry out their mission.  This means 
that they are not confined to operational boundaries and, therefore, can expand their 
mission based on real-world occurrences, not prescribed phase lines or templates which 
can severely hinder military operations. 
There is no doubt that PCMFs play a tremendous part in supporting U.S. military 
operations, but they may also be causing a “brain-drain” on the military ranks.  The PMI 
is a ready and willing recipient of those with valuable military skill sets and because 
former military members enter the private sector with extensive training, they are 
immediately mission capable.  This means that PCMFs rarely have to develop training 
programs to get their new employees up to speed—creating a mutually beneficial and 
sustainable system. 
In The Market for Force, Deborah Avant implies that all of the above assist the 
PCMF in growing more and more robust, but this growth (potentially) comes at a great 
cost to the military.  Avant begins the discussion (to be advanced later in this chapter) 
that PCMFs may be testing the limits of civil-military relations from unprecedented 
angles.  She summarizes this in the following: 
The blurring of lines between the military and [PCMFs] may also call into 
question the esteem with which Americans view the military, changing the 
value placed on military service, causing difficulties with military 
                                                 
87 It would be interesting to compare PCMF proliferation with that of voluntary military separation.  
Although the author concedes this to be an extemporaneous study outside the intentions of this thesis, he 
nonetheless speculates that there is at least some corollary relationship.   
88 A contemporary theory exists that the UCMJ could serve as a control measure over private 
contractors.  This is inappropriate however, and will be addressed in detail in Chapter VI. 
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recruitment and/or retention, and diminishing U.S. military effectiveness.  
Any of these could spur disruption and change that could feed into a 
disintegrative challenge to the control of force in the U.S.89 
2. Operational Boundaries 
OIF presented military commanders with unique challenges, none more important 
than the de-confliction of efforts between PCMFs and military ground forces.  Although 
Afghanistan and, to some degree, other regional conflicts presented similar hurdles, Iraq 
was the first area to provided substantial exposure between PCMFs and the U.S. military 
in a highly complex, and often densely populated, urban environment.  Further 
complicating the operational environment was, again, the insistence on COIN.  COIN is 
hard enough to conduct in a U.S./host-nation environment, but when you add a third 
party to the mix, in this case PCMFs—who can simultaneously support DoS and DoD 
initiatives—you get a mixing bowl of directives and subsequent results.  In order to 
mitigate this, both primary U.S. entities—contractors and the military—tried to separate 
themselves from one another, but this resulted in “stovepiped”90 information and perhaps 
weakened operational efficiency.  The mutually exclusive relationship between the two 
organizations made a theoretical boundary and often polarized opinions on both sides, 
sometimes going so far as to cause apprehension between the DoS and the DOD. 
The lack of clearly defined operational boundaries only exacerbated the situation 
beyond the theoretical as both sides took separate viewpoints and measures of policing 
themselves.91  Military commanders readily accept and expect operational boundaries in 
order to define their relative “battlespace”92—an area in which the ground commander 
                                                 
89 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force, The Consequences of Privatizing Security,(New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 138. 
90 A common term in military lexicon that refers to an entity planning without external help or 
refusing—either knowingly or unknowingly—to share operationally advantageous information. 
91 Operational boundaries are agreed upon, graphical displays of an area of operation (AO).  This area 
is usually depicted on a map and utilizes major terrain features, where available, as natural borders.  This 
area is then “assigned” to a unit as their area of responsibility (AOR) and is an important step in 
establishing tactical and operational control. 
92 Among ground forces, it refers to the lowest level, tactical commander’s immediate area.  This 
usually denotes a battalion, commanded by a lieutenant colonel (LTC).  Although it should be noted that 
there is an informal push to remove this term from discussions of COIN as it is not necessarily accurate in 
describing a commander’s influence in an asymmetrical environment.   
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has ownership, i.e., responsibility for what happens.  This ranges from the actions of his 
own unit, to those of host-nation forces, to even civilian incidents.  Additionally, by 
having a defined battlespace, senior military leaders are much more readily able to 
identify what their subordinates are doing.  Likewise, this instills in the subordinate a 
greater adherence to his mission and greater awareness of his actions and environment. 
Military leaders readily accept geographical boundaries for other reasons as well.  
Since battlespace owners are clearly defined, each military commander can readily depict 
who is on his flank and easily de-conflict cross-boundary missions.  At the highest levels, 
boundaries establish a common operating picture—an ability for the senior ranks to 
quickly grasp what is happening, why, and sometimes most importantly, to whom.   This 
manner of battle tracking allows the commanders the ability to quickly re-allocate forces, 
shift operational focus, and/or dispatch immediate resources.  Therefore, the 
establishment of operational boundaries is one of the very first measures taken upon 
receipt of deployment orders and is instrumental in establishing and maintaining 
command and control (C2) over any operational area—especially a combat zone, and 
perhaps even more so during contingency operations, where, without definitive control 
measures, the situation would be even more complex. 
But PCMFs are not restrained by the operational control parameters of the 
military.  Although PCMFs employ similar tactics in developing their projected areas of 
operations, they rarely share the information with military forces.  This is especially true 
of MDSFs who operate security operations and protective services, often in a shroud of 
secrecy.  As such, the battlespace can realistically contain U.S. armed forces with varying 
intentions and no cohesive methods of control. 
OIF revealed the theoretical wall between PCMFs and military co-operability, 
coupled with the lack of any synchronized, tangible control measures.   This meant that, 
in Iraq, highly trained U.S. armed forces with similar intent were acting mutually 
exclusively of one another.  The fact that more incidents of fratricide or tactically 
damaging confrontations did not occur is testament to the tremendous leadership 
exercised by both parties.  Control measures must be reformed so that, whether directly 
or indirectly, operational (and theoretical) boundaries can be clearly understood and 
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synchronized.   Sharing information and understanding one another’s limitations go a 
long way towards maximizing efficiency.  Failure to develop such reforms will continue 
to put U.S. personnel––and their mission––at odds with each other, unnecessarily. 
3 Justifying Expenditures 
There is substantial scholarly work and emerging analytical data surrounding the 
expenditures and funds spent in support of U.S. operations in Iraq.93  Rather than simply 
re-present this data, this particular section will focus on the institutional arrangements 
which perhaps had greater impacts than previously suggested. 
The need for greater fidelity in understanding operational boundaries was 
certainly a significant discovery during OIF, but so too was the amount of money spent 
there, and, perhaps more alarming, the lack of its supervision.94  Three primary 
assumptions are made here.  (1) That the U.S. lacked the expertise necessary to regulate 
its own contracts;  (2) That PCMFs were able to exploit this inability; and, (3) that the 
lack of initial ground forces may have contributed to the DoD’s ability to effectively 
utilize follow-on forces in a wider spectrum.  Regardless, the U.S. was woefully 
unprepared for the amount of PCMF involvement in OIF—both in depth and scope. 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting issued its final report in August, 2011 
and declared that “at least $31 billion has been lost to contract waste and fraud”95 but 
went on to speculate that this figure could be double.  Although the report included both 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it points to a more serious concern—the lack of any substantial 
oversight. 
                                                 
93 I am thinking here of the findings in the 2007 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, commonly referred to as The Gansler Report, as well as the 
Congressional Budget Office, and the Government Accounting Office, to name a few.  All of these present 
ample evidence regarding specific financial expenditures, fraud, waste and abuse, and address current 
methodological inadequacies, but, in my opinion, fail to provide any substantial examination of the 
relationships between the civil-military institutions that may be contributing to extended contracts and a 
flawed way of doing business. 
94 Analysts have called the reliability of the DOD data into question. The Government Accountability 
Office revealed “that the DOD’s quarterly contractor reports were not routinely checked for accuracy or 
completeness.”  Further, the DOD did not start collecting contractor data until the second half of 2007, 
despite employing contractors from the onset of operations.  Additionally, keeping track of contractors is a 
tremendous challenge, as “contractors rotate in and out of theater more often than soldiers do.” See, David 
Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (2009). 
95 CWC-NR-49, Wartime Contracting Commission final report to Congress, August, 2011, 1. 
 50
The use of PCMFs and contracting out services exploded in Iraq.  But the 
comparative agencies/expertise designed to manage them did not.  There was a 
tremendous amount of over reliance on contractors coupled with very little experienced 
supervision.  The Commission found that the number of contract specialists, whose sole 
function was/is to oversee contingency contracting, rose by only three percent 
government-wide between 1992–2009, despite an enormous increase in contracting 
activity during that period.96 
The justification for such an immense reliance on contracting out services falls 
somewhere between the government’s needs (both the U.S. and Iraq) and the contractor’s 
capabilities.  In OIF, both the U.S. and Iraq needed multiple agencies to deal with 
security issues and civic concerns, simultaneously.  This was largely outside the scope of 
influence of the force on the ground, especially considering the numbers of troops 
initially involved.97  Although beyond the intent of this thesis, it is not unreasonable to 
hypothesize that the numbers of forces utilized during the invasion may have had indirect 
effects on the military’s capabilities to exercise initiatives beyond their initial 
expectations.  This becomes even more plausible considering that the DoD’s obligations 
for contracts far outweighed those of other agencies.98 
PCMFs were a quick solution to any operational gaps, as they offered 
customizable packages that could perform a wide variety of services.  Perhaps even more 
important than their provisions, however, was what they meant to the numbers of 
uniformed personnel.  PCMFs meant fewer troops were necessary—both during the 
invasion and later, during contingency operations.  This is no small consideration and 
should be retained for further discussion, primarily because opponents of PCMFs believe 
their existence to be detrimental to good order and discipline but, I believe the opposite to 
be true.  The military would need to produce and deploy well over one hundred thousand 
                                                 
96 CWC-NR-49. 
97 Retired Army General Shinseki suggested in 2002, that he would like to have substantially more 
forces than the 150,000 desired by the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.  A source of 
contention between the two that resulted in Rumsfeld publicly announcing Shinseki’s retirement eighteen 
months ahead of schedule.   
98 According to the CBO’s report, from 2003-2007, DoD’s $76 billion in contract obligations 
accounted for 90 percent of all dollars awarded.  USAID and OSD were second and third, respectively. 
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additional troops to OIF alone if PCMFs were not part of the equation.  That is a sobering 
statistic as it carries with it the very real problem of where these service members would 
come from.  PCMFs are expensive to employ, certainly, but they are a much more 
politically palatable option than a request for an all-volunteer force to extend its 
deployment times in the face of two wars.  Worse, the absence of PCMFs tables the 
discussion of reinstituting the draft.  Barring a severe shift in current American ideology, 
this author believes the latter to be completely untenable.  
While PCMFs potentially alleviate military personnel burdens they perhaps cause 
unnecessary financial obligations.  This is primarily due to how PCMFs are contracted.  
While the primary methods of billing will be addressed in specifics later in this thesis, it 
should be noted here that the current arrangements seem conducive to the abuse 
mentioned in the The Gansler Report.99    KBR for example operates under a cost-plus 
contract which means the firm is paid for all of its allowed expenses to a set limit plus 
additional payment to allow for a profit.100  If substantial consideration is not warranted 
to this type of arrangement, then mismanagement and corruption are strong possibilities. 
B. OPERATIONAL CONFRONTATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
The concerns that were previously implied regarding boundaries, i.e., that there 
was little synchronization of effort and intent between PCMFs and the military in OIF, 
played themselves out on more than one occasion.  Because boundaries were rarely de-
                                                 
 99 The Gansler Report pointed the finger at the lack of quality trained personnel and methods, i.e., that 
there simply weren’t enough contracting specialists and/or a system robust enough to oversee that 
appropriate methods of QA/QC were followed.  The absence of either of these two produced an 
environment easily exploited.  In order to address the discovered weaknesses, the report concluded with 4 
recommendations: 
 1. Increase the Stature, Quantity, and Career Development of the Army’s Contracting Personnel, 
Military and Civilian (Especially for Expeditionary Operations), 47. 
2.  Restructure Organization and Restore Responsibility to Facilitate Contracting and Contract 
Management in Expeditionary and CONUS Operations, 51. 
3.  Provide Training and Tools for Overall Contracting Activities in Expeditionary Operations, 55. 
4.  Obtain Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy Assistance to Enable Contracting Effectiveness in 
Expeditionary Operations, 56. 
 100 Definition of cost-plus contracts accessed through Center for Strategic International Studies, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081016_diig_cost_plus.pdf. 
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conflicted, if ever established, military forces and PCMFs often butted heads.  Some of 
these encounters were rather mundane, nothing more than contractual disagreements or 
dissenting opinions regarding who had authority.  But some were significant enough to 
warrant investigations.  Although these events were mostly isolated, their occurrence 
often caused unprecedented procedures to be initiated.  The confrontations between 
PCMFs and Iraqis were sometimes an altogether different matter.  Some, as we will see, 
had consequences far beyond the geographical landscape of Iraq. 
The strategic consequences of these confrontations underlie perhaps a more—in 
international context—significant issue.  The relative impunity with which PCMFs 
operate is indicative of their status as a non-state actor, a role that has been growing in 
influence since the end of the Cold War.  OIF would test this influence as it would place 
a non-state actor in direct confrontation with an emerging nation-state.  The results of this 
confrontation may very well have set precedents that the United States may regret.  Only 
time will tell.  But, if it is true as some, like Christopher Spearin, have indicated,101 that 
the nation-state model is losing its dominance, then we can expect that non-state actors, 
e.g., PCMFs, will grow even more influential.  The importance of this consideration 
cannot be overemphasized because it implies the absolute necessity of legal reforms 
regarding PCMFs. 
1. Contractors and Fallujah 
In March of 2004, four Blackwater contractors operating two separate SUVs led 
three flatbed trucks into the heart of Fallujah.  At the time, Fallujah was becoming a 
hotbed of insurgent activity and was operating under ad-hoc, tribal structures.  The First 
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) had recently taken over military authority in the 
                                                 
101 Christopher Spearin, Privatized Peace? Assessing the interplay between states, humanitarians and 
private security companies, as taken from Private Military and Security Companies, Ethics policies and 
civil-military relations, eds, Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina Caparini (NY: Routledge 
Press, 2008), 203–213.  Spearin addresses the argument that the traditional nature of statecraft is in 
question.  Summarizing that: 
[D]espite the emphasis placed on them in international affairs, many states in the post-
colonial or post-communist contexts lack the ability to provide for their citizenries and to 
ensure their security as assumed in the Hobbesian bargain.  The advent of human 
security, therefore, points towards readjusting the balance between ends and means such 
that individuals are threated more as the former and states as the latter.  205.  
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region from the 82nd Airborne Division and was intent on doing things a little bit 
differently.   The Marines wanted more emphasis placed on engaging insurgents, but this 
was becoming easier said than done, as insurgent activity seemed to correspond with that 
of the Marines.  The Marines had yet begun to advance heavily into the heart of the city, 
however, and were at the time conducting continuous operations in Fallujah’s outskirts.  
With no sizeable military presence, the four Blackwater contractors were about to go 
directly into the city’s center and, unfortunately, would not return.  The Blackwater 
convoy was ambushed, all four contractors were killed, and their bodies were 
dismembered, burned, and hung from a bridge over the Euphrates.  The images were 
startling and galvanizing. 
The incident was tragic but underscored serious operational concerns.  There 
were, of course, calls for justice and retaliation—a plea to the moral code of warriors.  
But, although the Blackwater contractors were Americans, they were not soldiers.  They 
were there under contract and so the moral argument seemed out of place.  Perhaps if 
they had been soldiers there would have been a more immediate response from the 
Marines.  But as it were, there was some confusion regarding how to react.  There were 
questions being raised that, until now, had gone unnoticed.  Why were the men allowed 
to enter the city?  Should there have been a military escort?  Who oversaw their 
operations?  What were their Rules of Engagement (RoE)? 
Over seven years later, very similar questions are still being asked, not just about 
that tragic incident but about America’s relationship with PCMFs in general. Ironically, 
had these questions been asked with more authority in 2004, perhaps another polarizing 
tragedy would not have happened a mere three years later.  But this incident would go 
well beyond operational flaws.  It would have strategic implications and test the very 
fabric of U.S./Iraq relations. 
2. Blackwater and Nisour Square 
Iraq continued to present significant hurdles to all U.S. forces and officials 
involved, and by 2007 the situation was becoming very politically sensitive.  The surge 
had seen thousands more of U.S. troops pour into the region in the hopes that Iraq would 
not devolve into a Civil War.  Ethnic and tribal tensions were high, and the fledgling 
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government was trying to assert its authority but still facing questions of legitimacy and 
doubt from its own constituents.  In the fall of 2007, these doubts would be put to the test. 
On September 16, 2007, a convoy of armored SUVs carrying Blackwater 
contractors and U.S. VIPs made its way into Nisour Square, Baghdad, Iraq.  There are 
still conflicting reports over exactly what happened that day, but for whatever reason(s), 
the Blackwater convoy opened fire in the square.  After it was over, 17 Iraqi civilians lay 
dead, many more wounded, and dozens of civilian vehicles destroyed or burning.102   
Blackwater claimed that their men were returning fire from insurgents while the Iraqis 
claimed that the shooting was unprovoked.  Several members of Blackwater eventually 
stood trial in a U.S. District Court for their part in the shooting but the case was 
dismissed in 2009.103 
The incident had an even greater impact however, than the immediate and tragic 
loss of lives. The shooting sparked outrage in the Arab world, polarized the opinions of 
the American public, and revealed publically, the growing dependence that the U.S. had 
upon PCMFs.  The case also revealed the dramatic amount of legal latitude that 
surrounded PMCFs and brought into question the legality of their use.   Furthermore, the 
incident would test, in earnest, the relationship between the U.S. and the newly formed 
Iraqi government.  The Iraqi government demanded that Blackwater be expelled from the 
country and the guards tried under Sharia law.  The U.S. claimed jurisdiction and stressed 
the valued commodities that the corporation had provided over significant operations and 
personnel.  In perhaps a gesture to placate Arab-U.S. tension, the U.S. chose not to renew 
Blackwater’s contract in Iraq, and therefore, effectively removed them from Iraqi soil.  
The blowback upon the company’s image was so severe that it never fully recovered.104    
 
                                                 
102 Jeremy Scahill’s book. Blackwater, offers a detailed look into the Nisour tragedy including the 
events leading up to, during, and after the shootings.    
103 United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115-116 (D. C C. 2009).  The court determined that 
the Blackwater defendants had been compelled to make self-incriminating statements regarding their 
actions which ultimately,  threatened the viability of the prosecution.  The court dismissed the case against 
all defendants. 
104 Blackwater tried to remodel itself after Nisour, purging many senior executives and going so far as 
to change its name to Xe (since renamed to Academi). 
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Since that fateful day, the U.S. has taken measures to regulate the use of private security 





At this point in the thesis the original hypothesis seems not only valid, but 
justified, i.e., that establishing a status-based, legal framework will promote legitimacy, 
increase effectiveness, and mitigate concerns—both domestically and abroad.  By 
utilizing OIF as a case study, this chapter presented evidence of the United States’ 
reliance on PCMFs, the depth to which this dependency runs––from manpower, to 
services rendered, and to budget allocation––and the consequences that this intrinsic 
relationship has had. 
PCMFs are very real, and ultimately, can be beneficial entities in supporting U.S. 
force projection and operations of national interests.105  But they cannot be incorporated 
effectively, i.e., without global skepticism.  If realistic reforms are not taken to maximize 
their potential, protect all parties involved, and ensure clear means of accountability—
they will continue to be a source of political tension.   Therefore, PCMFs must be 
transparent in their actions and intent. 
The following chapter will look at the peculiar omission of PCMF recognition in 
any formal form—besides their post-facto analysis.  Additionally, the following chapter 
will take a cursory look at how the relationship between PCMFs and the United States 






                                                 
105 I am referring here to the ever growing scope of opportunities that are presenting themselves to 
PCMFs, i.e., peacekeeping operations, humanitarian/disaster relief operations, and of course, the wide 
spectrum of contingency operations – an area that, through OIF and OEF, has made them a valuable 
commodity on the international market. 
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V. RECOGNITION VS. EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
If a strategy does not address ends, ways, and means, it is not a strategy 
but a set of aspirations.106 
 
In traditional theory,107 states oversee the control and application of violence.  
This is the recognized order of the modern world and is found in Max Weber’s 
discourse—often the foundation for state-centric scholarly discussion.  Deborah Avant 
cites as much, summarizing Weber’s contribution as “the obvious starting point in most 
investigations and even those who argue that globalization and the rise of non-state actors 
have affected vast portions of the world’s political arena generally assume that coercive 
power still resides with the state.”108  The rise of PCMFs has disrupted this order, 
however, so much so that their influence may have irreversibly damaged the states’ claim 
as the sole proprietor of violence.  As we have seen in OIF, the reliance on PCMFs was 
extraordinary, in some instances accounting for 50 percent of the DoD’s workforce in 
Iraq. 
While privatizing elements of force enhancement is not unprecedented, the 
measure to which it was done so in Iraq, was.  The fact of the matter is that PCMFs now 
perform many of the services which, not so long ago, were considered core 
responsibilities of the military.  Also, the nature of conflict itself has changed with 
contingency operations often replacing the traditional warcraft between named 
belligerents.  In this regard, PCMFs offer attractive methods to engage and/or protect a 
state’s interests without mobilizing its military.  This is even more attractive to emerging 
democracies who can utilize PCMFs as a cost effective method to assert their authority, 
and ironically, potentially demonstrate legitimacy as a body politic capable of projecting 
                                                 
106 Jim Lacey, “The Death of Military Strategy,” online article accessed through The National Review, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271678/death-military-strategy-jim-lacey#. Jim Lacey is professor 
of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College. 
107 I am referring here to prominent Political Science and Sociological thought professed by Peter 
Fever, Max Weber, Sam Huntington, Morris Janowitz, et al, wherein states are defined, at least, 
subjectively by the ability to wage war. 
108 Avant, The Market of Force, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946), 3. 
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forces on behalf of their own national interests.  Furthermore, transnational actors such as 
NGOs and multi-national corporations are increasingly looking to PCMFs as a viable 
option to accomplish their goals.  All of this is relevant to the position of the Westphalian 
state, since “a burgeoning transnational market for force now exists alongside the system 
of states and state forces.”109 
“Why,” Avant writes, “should we worry—or even care—about this market?  The 
answer is simple, [PCMFs] may affect how and whether people can control violence.”110 
Although Avant is basing her work on MSDFs, this thesis advances that the entire private 
military industry influences the management of violence and therefore—although 
agreeing with her conclusion—suggests the topic be discussed more broadly.  That being 
said, if we hold Avant’s conclusion to be accurate then we immediately see the necessity 
for constructing the argument of this thesis.  Namely, to establish control measures that 
will mitigate domestic and international concerns over the utilization of PCMFs in 
support of a democratic projection of force.  But to be effective, these control measures 
must be universal, i.e., applicable to both states and non-state actors. 
In A History of Warfare, John Keegan challenges the Clausewitzian theory that 
“war is the continuation of politics by other means.”  Keegan makes the assumption that 
Clausewitz was describing what war ought to be,111 i.e., that war was waged on behalf of 
the state’s public sphere—described by Avant as “the institution through which the use of 
violence could be most effectively linked to endeavors endorsed by a collective.”112  
Clausewitz’s theory has endured because it represents the traditional (and familiar) 
linkage between the use of violence for political processes and the social norms within a 
territory.113 But Clausewitz could not have predicted the amount of influence of the 
private sphere, i.e., the mass proliferation of PCMFs and their ability to be utilized as 
combat multipliers or even sole, force providers to both states and transnational actors.  
Additionally, it is hard to imagine that Clausewitz could have foreseen the current threat 
                                                 
109 Avant, The Market for Force, 3. 
110 Ibid. 
111 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), 1–6. 
112 Avant, The Market for Force, 3. 
113 Ibid. 
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environment; much less the impacts that COIN would have on how states––specifically 
Western powers––and non-state actors navigate within it. 
All of this implies that the lines between national security and global security are 
becoming increasingly blurred.114  Further obscuring any clarity are the interests of the 
non-state actors whose endeavors rarely have any collective cohesion.  “This,” Avant 
writes, “is true for moralists who feel responsible to intervene in order to help quell 
violence, pragmatists who worry about economic disruptions, and…realists who worry 
about breeding grounds for terrorists.”115  The latter comment carries significant weight, 
post-9/11, as the United States, as the unipolar power of the world, has taken direct 
interests in far-flung regions of the world under the rationale of its national security.  
Unable (politically and economically) to project its military into these areas in any 
substantial numbers, the U.S. has increasingly turned to PCMFs.  Following the U.S.’s 
lead, various NGOs and multi-national corporations have done the same, finding the 
value in pursuing their own goals while remaining politically distant from potential 
repercussions. 
Access to PCMFs have changed the landscape of violence management and 
greatly increased the ways and methods that any interested party can advance its own 
agenda beyond traditional means, i.e., uniformed force projection.  This does not mean 
that the role of the state has been weakened—only changed to incorporate a much wider 
spectrum of actors and interests.  The complexity of this design, however, requires 
significant oversight or else it runs the risk of damaging the international norms of 
accepted state behavior.  This is even more important considering the varying capacities 
of states.  Developed, Western powers have a substantial foundation and numerous 
institutions in place capable for securing the limitations of PCMF influence.  Whether 
they are effectively utilizing them is another matter.  Several emerging democratic 
powers however, are still struggling with the management of statecraft.  Considering this, 
it is essential that the United States—as the democratic world leader—enact measures 
that will set the necessary precedents for legitimate PCMF utilization. 
                                                 
114 Avant, The Market for Force, 33. 
115 Ibid., 33–34. 
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This chapter will look to the peculiarity of PCMF omission from the majority of 
the United States’ security documents in order to emphasize that effective reforms cannot 
take place until a public admission and nationally inclusive strategy regarding PCMF 
capabilities is developed.  This chapter will also call the government to task by 
highlighting its current nom de guerre “whole of government” approach as wholly 
inaccurate without the formal inclusion of PCMFs.  Finally, this chapter will advance the 
trinity of democratic civilian control116 offered by Professor Thomas Bruneau as the 
theoretical framework for future PCMF reforms. 
A. U.S. STRATEGIC TRINITY VS. THE QDR: A PECULIAR 
RELATIONSHIP 
The reliance on PCMFs by the U.S. is understood but what about the stigma that 
accompanies them?  Whether under the misnomer of mercenary or under the accusation 
that they act with questionable motives, PCMFs operate in a politically delicate 
landscape.  For this reason, politicians, cabinet members, and senior DoS and DoD 
personnel want to distance themselves from any direct association with their use.  
Perhaps there is no better example of this than the glaring omission—at least directly—of 
PCMFs, the PMI, or even the term contractor in the triad of America’s strategic 
documents.117  Substantiating this claim is that the term contractor is mentioned directly 
within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),118 implying that PCMF use is 
recognized but only after the fact, i.e., when their utilization—especially on such a large 
scale as it was in OIF—cannot escape public scrutiny.  Furthermore, the QDR represents 
                                                 
116 I am referring to the three dimensions of democratic civil-military relations developed by Dr. 
Thomas C. Bruneau, Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California.  These are: civilian authority, effectiveness, and efficiency.  See, Bruneau, Patriots 
for Profit, and Who Guards the Guardians and How?  
117 The National Security Strategy, The National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. 
118 Jeffrey D. Brake, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues, Library 
of Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Office. The congressionally mandated Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) directs DoD to undertake a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and 
resources. Specifically, the QDR is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the 
most recent National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan 
allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy. The report will 
include an evaluation by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
military's ability to successfully execute its missions at a low-to-moderate level of risk within the forecast 
budget plan.  Accessed through: http://www.stormingmedia.us/90/9037/A903774.html. 
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the entire Department of Defense as opposed to any single, staff entity or office, and is 
generated from within the Pentagon—the single largest governmental employer of private 
military and security contractors.      
Perhaps, it is reasonable to surmise that the proclamations of the aggregate do not 
suffer the same scrutiny of the individual, and so the QDR, representing the entire DoD, 
has more latitude than would say, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) which represents 
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  Although a plausible assumption it has a glaring 
weakness—the NDS is a strategy, worse, it is part of the strategy for preserving the 
national security of the United States.   A similar scenario could be applied to the 
National Military Strategy (NMS).  Like the NDS, the NMS represents both the DoD and 
a specific office, in this case, the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS).  Both documents are part of a larger scheme—formally proclaiming the national 
interests of the United States—but have the fallibility of being tied an individual.  This 
means that the wording in the respective documents is purposefully ambiguous.   If this 
contention is even closely accurate than it stands to reason that the pinnacle of the three 
documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS)—would perhaps be even more so as it 
comes directly from the Office of the President of the United States (POTUS).  This is 
not to say that ambiguous word choice is a calamity however, as the context of a senior 
political document, by most accounts, should provide the issuer with a certain degree of 
separation.  But it is to say that, as a collective strategy, the documents should reaffirm 
their intentions to their respective audience.  At the very least, the documents should take 
a hard look at the ends (what do you want done?), ways (how do you want it done?), and 
means (what resources are available to do it with?) that it is dispensing.  After all, if 
effective guidance is not issued during the strategy then accountability after the execution 
is virtually impossible. 
An omission or inclusion of any specific entity by one of the documents usually 
correlates to the same in the other two.  This is altogether fitting as it demonstrates unity 
of effort towards achieving U.S. objectives.  But by omitting such a vital part of how the 
U.S. actually performs these objectives, i.e., PCMFs, the documents are revealing the 
same unfortunate affliction that permeates the discussion of COIN.  Namely, that the 
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documents are saying something without saying anything.  The U.S. produces its strategic 
documents in direct relation to one another and in so doing, attempts to achieve a synergy 
of intentions with each document owing its legitimacy to its predecessor.  For example, 
last year the Department of Defense released the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS), 
which purports to explain how the military will support the National Defense Strategy, 
which in turn explains how the Department of Defense will support the objectives of the 
National Security Strategy.  Taken together, the three documents are supposed to provide 
our military leaders with all the strategic-planning guidance they require for the next 
year.119 
The failure of the three documents to directly mention PCMFs120 implies that 
they are not a legitimate means of reaching strategic intent.  Realistically, nothing could 
be farther from the truth.  Removing direct attribution from the documents reveals a 
different story—as is the case in the 2010 QDR which, representing the entire DoD, has 
the latitude to admit the following: 
The Department is facing mission requirements of increasing scope, 
variety, and complexity. To ensure the availability of needed talent to 
meet future demands, we are conducting a deliberate assessment of current 
and future workforce requirements. This effort will ensure that the 
Department has the right workforce size and mix 
(military/civilian/contractor) with the right competencies. This assessment 
will be enterprise-wide, enabling the Department to better recruit and 
retain personnel with the most-needed skills. 
The services provided by contractors will continue to be valued as parts of 
a balanced approach that properly considers both mission requirements 
and overall return. In keeping with the Administration's goal of reducing 
the government's dependence on contractors, the Department introduced 
its in-sourcing initiative in the FY 2010 budget. Over the next five years, 
                                                 
119 Lacey, The Death of Military Strategy, 1. 
120 It should be noted however that all three documents refer to the “private sector” and, in the case of 
the NSS, mentions “ credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with tailored approaches to 
deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains—
land, air, sea, space, and cyber. It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their 
responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security.  While the use of force is sometimes 
necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and 
risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction”. National Security Strategy, 22.  Furthermore, the 
NDS mentions the “total force” in pages 17 and 19, respectively but drawing conclusions to this phrase and 
PCMFs is subjective, at best. 
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the Department will reduce the number of support service contractors to 
their pre-2001 level of 26 percent of the workforce (from the current level 
of 39 percent) and replace them, if needed, with full-time government 
employees. These efforts will help establish a balanced total workforce of 
military, government civilians, and contractor personnel that more 
appropriately aligns public-and private-sector functions, and results in 
better value for the taxpayer.121 
The reference to contractors in the QDR represents how intrinsically tied to all 
levels of DoD operations they have become, even going so far as to admit that some of 
their services may best be supplied instead by the federal workforce. 
This chapter proposes that the QDR’s recognition is a positive step in recognizing 
PCMF influence.  Doing so takes precedence in addressing the pros and cons of their 
continued use and encourages a hard look at their cost effectiveness, legality, and 
legitimacy as an effective tool in promoting U.S. national interest.  Conversely, failure to 
admit their roles in the U.S. strategic documents, regardless of the political motives, is 
serving three larger causes.  (1) That the regulations concerning PCMF utilization will be 
difficult to enact, much less reformed, if they are not publically and formally included in 
U.S. lexicon.  (2) The omission of PCMFs is facilitating their ability to continue to 
operate in “shades of gray”—removed from public discourse since no attention is 
afforded them—officially, and ultimately, with little legal and financial impunity.    
(3) Failure to mention them in official U.S. strategies facilitates international 
apprehension of U.S. motives, especially once U.S. contracted PCMFs are encountered 
by a host-nation; simultaneously exacerbating informal public discussion of mercenaries, 
e.g., Blackwater, and suspicious governmental ties to privatized corporations, e.g., KBR. 
1. Whole of Government Approach and PCMF inclusion 
There is fallibility with excluding PCMFs in the U.S. strategic documents.  It fails 
to recognize them as part of the current “whole of government” approach.  This phrase 
has come to mean the “interagency” or “interorganizational” or whatever term may be the 
current flavor in trying to describe the synchronization of effort among the DoD, DoS, 
NGOs, et al.  Instituted by the Obama administration in 2010, the whole of government 
                                                 
121 2010 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 55-56. 
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approach was meant to serve as a concept, capturing the administration’s intent on 
unifying U.S. efforts.  Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton confirmed as much when she 
said: 
One of our goals coming into the administration was … to begin to make 
the case that defense, diplomacy and development were not separate 
entities, either in substance or process, but that indeed they had to be 
viewed as part of an integrated whole and that the whole of government 
then had to be enlisted in their pursuit.122 
The whole of government approach permeates the entire National Security 
Strategy and is indicative of the President’s call for innovation and ambition across the 
entire spectrum of national defense.  PCMFs may be implied in this regard but the term 
contractor is glaringly admitted.  As mentioned earlier however, this omission is more a 
by-product of political necessity than negligence.  The 2010 NSS was the Obama 
Administration’s first, and was built upon the lessons learned in OIF/OEF and the 
researched conclusions of the 2010 QDR.  For this reason, more consideration should 
have been given to the inclusion of PCMFs.  After all, waging two wars without them 
would have been nearly impossible, while writing the QDR without mentioning them, 
would have been misleading.  However well intended the phrase “whole of government,” 
it is incomplete without directly admitting the role of the contractor and/or the services 
these entities provide. 
Additionally, the admission of contractor importance to U.S. operations within the 
latest QDR should have encouraged a similar address in the NSS.  Especially considering 
the emphasis the QDR takes on replacing, where applicable, contracted services with 
federal positions—a recognition that implies PCMFs were/are consuming a considerable 
portion of the DoD’s budget.  When read independently from the QDR however, the NSS 
glosses over the impact that PCMFs have in current U.S. national security initiatives, 
only hinting at combined efforts.   But when read in conjunction with the QDR, the 
disparity is alarming.   On the one hand is the NSS (and subsequent U.S. strategic 
documents) which makes no direct mention of any related PCMF terms, implying that 
                                                 
122 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in a speech given at the Brookings Institution, May 27th 
2010, accessed at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/142312.htm. 
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their contributions are peripheral at best.  While on the other hand, is the U.S. 
Quadrennial Defense Review which offers not only the utility of contractors but also that 
their utilization has become so prevalent that it is now a valid budgetary concern, so 
much so that the QDR implies a reexamination of the current division of labor.   
Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that the exclusion of PCMF related terms within 
the NSS is more akin to denial than dismissiveness. 
There is another possible reason for excluding any mention of terms related to 
PCMFs within the NSS—control.  Currently, there is a tremendous amount of confusion 
regarding exactly who exercise authority over PCMFs and how they are held accountable 
for their actions.123  This is of great concern to politicians and senior military leaders 
alike since without being able to clearly define ownership or identify legal parameters 
they are, in essence, allowing para-military organizations and lucrative big business 
corporations to make their own rules.  A proposition that is uncomfortable to say the least 
but in wartime seems borderline criminal.  No respectable businessman, politician, or 
senior military leader is willing to offer up a topic for public discussion that provides 
more questions than answers.  It simply does not make sense—businesswise or 
politically.  Although, admittedly, tying this reason to individual political motives may be 
argumentative, it nonetheless remains at least a periphery variable that, in conjunction 
with the other recognitions, belies the necessity for a status–based framework of 
regulations. 
B. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS AND BRUNEAU’S TRINITY 
The lack of unity in the U.S. strategic documents not only reveals a certain level 
of political discomfort, it also, potentially, challenges U.S. civil–military relations from 
unprecedented angles.  This is not to imply that the disparity recognizes a “gap” in the 
                                                 
123 There is tremendous confusion over control vs. accountability when it comes to PCMFs.  Control, 
in traditional U.S. terms, means a multi–layered institutional system capable of personal management over 
the actor – either directly or indirectly.  Accountability means there is no personal level of supervision 
beyond that of the contract between the principal and the agent.  See, Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 157–159.  
While legally, accurate, the latter does little to affect organizational behavior.  Both terms have been 
applied to PCMFs but since there really are no institutional control measures over them and current 
accountability measures seem lacking, U.S. politicians may choose to avoid association with the entire 
industry.  
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field of CMR similar to those already identified.124  On the contrary, the QDR, in taking 
the initiative in recognizing PCMF reliance, implies a concern worthy of discussion, i.e., 
that the current privatized sector/DoD relationship is so symbiotic that it needs to be 
addressed in detail, else the arrangement could drift into an inseparable entity with the 
potential to become a self–sustaining and self–regulating agency.  Considering this 
proposition a “civil–military gap” would almost be a welcome occurrence.  What this 
section is suggesting is that the disparity in the U.S. formally recognizing the roles of 
PCMFs goes beyond the traditional, domestic issue of a state’s democratic civilian 
control over its military125 and instead is entering into uncharted waters. 
This is suggested in the following two claims: (1) PCMFs have become some of 
the most influential non–state actors in U.S. history.  (2) Globalization is rapidly 
expanding the market for force and increasing their influence exponentially. 
This section will address these two separate but linked claims and analyze how, 
collectively, they are straining U.S. civil–military relations beyond historically accepted 
norms.  In order to do this effectively, this section will analyze the three dimensions of 
civil–military relations advanced by Professor Thomas Bruneau, Distinguished Professor 
at the Naval Postgraduate School.  “Bruneau’s trinity”126 will serve as the framework for 
understanding where and how PCMFs fit within the U.S. CMR construct and, to a larger  
 
                                                 
124 I am thinking here of Paul Braken, “Reconsidering Civil–Military Relations; Richard Kohn, The 
Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today, and the RAND Corporation which 
published a paper in 2007 titled “The Civil–Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and 
Does It Matter?” It is interesting to note the amount of scholarly attention devoted to the mythical “gap” as 
it seems largely irrelevant to the bigger picture, i.e., is the military and its civilian authority acting in 
accordance with legitimate institutions designed to protect and preserve them both and in the best interest 
of national interests?  If the answer is yes, then any “gap” is either nonexistent or irrelevant.  Braken states 
this succinctly in the following: 
The central role that civilian control has played in civil–military relations is 
understandable. But in its raw form it is a trivial problem because under nearly any 
conceivable set of arrangements civilian control is assured.  To over–concentrate on it 
when it is appropriate to do so will only elevate a host of ordinary misunderstandings and 
differences into a high political arena where they do not belong.  Moreover, it will 
distract attention from other important dimensions that characterize the relationship of the 
military to the state.  163. 
125 I am referring here to Samuel Huntington and Peter Feaver respectively, who focus on methods of 
control over the armed forces.    
126 This “trinity” includes democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
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degree within a globalized society.  This not only facilitates the goal of this thesis but 
also may foster a normative method for PCMF inclusion across the entire spectrum of 
civil–military relations. 
Bruneau’s framework presents a comparative approach that, although originally 
designed to be applicable to both old and new democracies,127 seems equally fitting as a 
both a measurable variable towards full integration of PCMFs into U.S. CMR, and as a 
stand-alone analytical tool capable of determining, through its three tiered approach, the 
validity of a PCMF’s performance potential.  This claim seems substantiated considering 
the similarities between PCMFs and the militaries or other instruments of security within 
emerging democracies.  Although, initially, Bruneau’s framework seems most applicable 
to MSDFs, it is not too far of an assumption to see its universal value across all PCMFs. 
Bruneau recognizes that, regardless of emerging democracies historical ties, either 
to authoritarian or civilian or military rule, the new regimes tend to place a greater 
emphasis on democratic security than national security.  He writes: 
In other words, these new regimes focus on how to ensure civilian control 
over the armed services, which in many cases were themselves previously 
in control of—or even constituted—the government.  Those military–
dominated regimes, by contrast, had tended to preoccupy themselves with 
national security, particularly internal security, often to the detriment of 
civil society. 
But what happens to the military and/or the other elements of security provision 
within these new democracies?  Who and /or what defines their new scope and 
responsibilities?  Absent of explicit guidance and operating within a system that is still 
defining itself, these militaries and their security brethren are often left to their own 
accord—at least within certain limits which in most cases could be considered  
 
                                                 
127 Bruneau developed his approach in 1996, shortly after he began to conduct programs on and in 
new democracies for the Center of Civil–Military Relations (CCMR), Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA.  See, Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 28.  Professor Bruneau is working currently with 
Professor Cristina Matei in analyzing, understanding, and teaching the lessons learned by consolidated 
democracies to emerging countries across the globe.  Their collective works have taken unprecedented 
steps in identifying the need for a thorough understanding of both domestic and international civil–military 
relations.  See, also, Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2012). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.663254.   
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rudimentary control measures designed to preserve some semblance of security while 
deterring abuse of authority.  But is such a situation so far removed from the actions of 
PCMFs?   
 Considering that PCMFs are non–state actors with still emerging boundaries, 
some being instituted ad hoc, then the analogy is perhaps closer than expected.  
Therefore, if Bruneau’s theoretical framework is, as recognized, a sufficient blueprint for 
balanced and legitimate civil–military relations, specifically as it applies to democratic 
governments, then it stands to reason that the same framework could be applied to the 
growing niche PCMFs are creating in CMR.  Incorporating PCMFs within this 
framework and thus, the scholarly discussions about CMR, should provide a more 
complete picture of the field, subsequently providing the principal (in most cases, the 
U.S.) with managerial guidance, while providing the agent with expected norms of 
behavior.  Furthermore, this framework would be beneficial in assisting to define the 
long–term, and potentially normative, PCMF/U.S. government (USG) relationship 
currently lacking in today’s discussions of CMR. 
The three dimensions in Bruneau’s model are democratic civilian control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency.  This section will take a look at each three and their 
respective applicability to the world of USG/PCMF relations.  It will highlight the 
aspirations of each dimension as well as any weaknesses towards PCMF/CMR alliance.  
Collectively, it is expected that this framework should be sufficient in establishing a 
theoretical foundation from which the status–based regulations can begin. 
1. Democratic Civilian Control 
 “Democratic civilian control,” Bruneau writes, 
comprises three aspects: civilian authority over institutional control 
mechanisms, normalized oversight, and the inculcation of professional 
norms through professional military education.  Direction and guidance 
must be grounded in…institutions...and [there must be] a well–defined 






the inculcation of professional norms supports the first two elements 
through transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, 
promotion, and retirement.128 
Control is the key word here as it requires a multi–layered approach, i.e., 
institutions that Bruneau is emphasizing.  The term control however, is often incorrectly 
interchanged with accountability when it comes to discussions of PCMFs.  But this is a 
misnomer and does not adequately address the fact that there is, as of yet, any substantial 
institution capable of directly aligning PCMF behavior with acceptable international 
norms.  This presents two serious concerns.  First, absent the recommended institutional 
control, PCMFs may be “writing their own checks,” i.e., determining their own roles and 
missions without any clear “chain of authority.”  And second, the U.S., as the 
predominant employer of PCMFs, could realistically institutionalize PCMF regulations in 
manners that would best serve purely U.S. interests.   
Either of these two considerations––PCMFs operating with no clear chain of 
authority or the U.S. establishing self–serving institutions––seem generally devoid of 
transparency and thus, severely degrade any attempt at producing democratic civilian 
control.  Combined, the results are even more ambiguous and yet, ironically, seem to be 
the default approach in current U.S./PCMF relations, i.e., reliance and denial running 
virtually hand in hand.  Put another way, PCMFs present a challenge on two 
simultaneous fronts.  (1) The U.S. needs the capabilities and provisions of PCMFs ––
evident in OIF, but (2), when the PCMFs behave in manners unbecoming acceptable 
international norms, they are dismissed as U.S. representatives.129  
Historically, this is an accepted trend.  But if PCMFs are to be used as effectively 
and efficiently as possible, they must first fall under transparent, democratic civilian 
control.  Perhaps the biggest hurdle to overcome, however, may be in getting the United 
                                                 
128 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 31. 
129 Such a precedent was set after the Blackwater shootings in Nisour Square in 2007.  The Nisour 
Square shooting ignited tremendous political concerns.  The official U.S. stance, perhaps issued in an 
attempt to placate Iraqi demands, stated that the Blackwater guards responsible would “be tried in Iraqi 
court” and “under Iraqi law.” See, Scahill, Blakwater, 12–20.  Such a statement was significant as the 
company was operating under a U.S. (DoS) contract but realistically, had no legal teeth behind it, primarily 
because in 2004, Paul Bremer had issued Order 17, effectively immunizing all contractors working for the 
U.S. in Iraq from Iraqi prosecution. Ibid., 15.     
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States government to examine the possibility that democratic civilian control, in this 
instance, may best be served by an international body––a proposition to be analyzed 
further in the next chapter.  This is an admittedly substantial hurdle as the U.S. has 
seldom, if ever, relinquished any amount of substantial sovereignty to entities outside its 
own scope of influence.130     
2. Effectiveness 
There are many nuances to this second dimension of democratic CMR.   After all, 
how well an entity (security force) performs its duties is often reliant on variables outside 
of its scope of influence.  Certainly, the “whole of government” concept comes to mind 
here, where agencies across the entire USG are encouraged to culminate their efforts for a 
desired end–state.  But how well these efforts are coordinated and how seamlessly the 
integration is between organizations is wholly a matter of perspective.  Making matters 
even more complex is the issue of deterrence.  If a state, agency, or force remains 
unthreatened due to its relative invulnerability—even if it is only perceived to be so, then 
does that mean that the elements that fostered its security are/were effective?  This is 
difficult to evaluate because, Bruneau writes, it is “trying to quantify a negative.”131 
If security forces—in this case, PCMFs,—are to be effective in CMR they must 
know what is expected of them and what resources they have available, including 
constraints and limitations.  This, again, underscores the need for institutions.  
Furthermore, effectiveness requires clear guidelines and strategy—something already 
recognized at the beginning of this chapter as completely ambiguous or, in some regards, 
altogether missing from PCMF discourse. 
3. Efficiency 
Efficiency is similar to effectiveness and in some cases the two words are used 
interchangeably.  But effectiveness, in the crudest terms, means getting the most out a 
                                                 
130 I am thinking here of the U.S. refusal to sign the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
U.S. reservations with the International Criminal Court, and the refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to 
name a few.  
131 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 32. 
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given input.  Phrases such as, “the most bang for your buck”, or “doing more with less” 
are synonymous with this description.  “Cost–effectiveness” is a more formally 
applicable term and is used often in dialogue regarding DoD expenditures and or USG 
initiatives.  But its use is more related to optimal choices within a monopoly of services 
provided than as a tool of measurement.132 
Efficiency shares another similarity to effectiveness.  Namely, that it cannot exist 
without some strategy.  Ironically, we again see a reference to the beginning of the 
chapter where the lack of a clear cut PCMF strategy was presented by analyzing the 
disparity in the U.S.’s strategic documents.  Although the lack of a national security 
strategy should not necessarily come as a surprise, considering most nations (especially 
emerging ones) are slow to produce one.  After all, when a state issues its national 
strategy, its government immediately subjects itself to its neighbors’ scrutiny.  
Nonetheless, a lack of formal strategy weakens democratic CMR and, makes it virtually 




This chapter presented evidence that the lack of formal strategy regarding 
contractors is detrimental to the USG’s ability to manage PCMFs.  While there are 
measures and agencies that have been implemented or tasked to mitigate the concerns 
surrounding PCMF utilization—the DoD in particular has instituted, at least rhetorically, 
relevant guidelines134—these measures cannot and will not be as effective without direct 
attention at the highest levels.  Failure of the USG to provide ends, ways, and means to 
                                                 
132 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 32. 
133 Efficiency (or cost–effectiveness) was/is a primary reason for the creation of the PNSR. 
134 See, Section 862 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which gives 
extensive guidance to the executive branch on the topic of “contractors performing private security 
functions in areas of combat operations”; a 2009 DoD directive “Interim final rule” that “establishes policy, 
assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, 
equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during 
contingency operations”; recommendations by the Special Investigating General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR), the GAO, and the Joint Chiefs’ Dependence on Contractors Task Force, to name a few.  See, also, 
Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, 159–161. 
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incorporate contractors within its national security strategies exacerbates the problem.  
Without these provisions the USG is, in essence, defining aspirations, not strategy. 
Looking beyond the doctrinal shortcomings, this chapter next focused on 
Professor Thomas C. Bruneau’s “three dimensions of democratic civil–military relations.  
Bruneau’s trinity of democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency serve as an 
analytical blueprint for addressing CMR concerns from emerging democracies, as those 
regimes are often seeking how to define the developing roles and responsibilities for their 
uninitiated militaries and various security forces.  This chapter concludes that Bruneau’s 
model is equally applicable to U.S. CMR in relation to PCMF utilization. 
The lack of definitive strategy coupled with Bruneau’s recognition of institutional 







VI. SEEKING LEGALITY—IDENTIFYING GAPS IN THE 
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK WHILE OFFERING 
RECOMMENDED REFORMS 
The new threat environment has been heralded (from the right and the 
left) as bringing with it new forms of warfare and the merging of security 
with a variety of other economic and political forms. Thus, “national” 
security has become difficult to distinguish from international or global 
security and the lines between internal and external security have 
blurred.135 
 
The U.S. is the majority stakeholder in PCMF activity; accounting for 53 percent 
of PCMFs.136  This position implies a tremendous amount in responsibility both 
domestically and abroad.   Domestically, the proliferation and reliance on PCMFs can 
have significant effects on the federal workforce, budgetary considerations, and overall 
support of DoD/DoS operations.  Internationally, as the unipolar power in the world, the 
U.S. has an implicit, moral obligation to all democratic societies.  This obligation must be 
tendered with even greater fidelity in a globalized world, as the actions of one (especially 
the most prominent) have significant influence on all.  Therefore, the recommended 
reform measures advanced herein are based upon the best interests of the United States, 
universally, and will take significant steps in mitigating domestic concerns while 
simultaneously securing its position of international democratic prominence. 
This chapter will build upon the theoretical framework advanced in Chapter V—
advancing recommended measures of reform that this thesis proposes is necessary and 
altogether overdue.  This chapter will therefore be the most legally detailed of the thesis, 
relying heavily on the work of Huma T. Yasin et al., in the legal field.  What follows is 
an analytical discussion that will examine inadequacies in current theories advocating 
PCMF control and recommend methods and institutions that may best address them.   
 
                                                 
135 Avant, The Market for Force, 33. 
136 Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, Figure 5.4. Geographical Distribution of PSCs, 121.  While this 
graphic represents PSCs in particular it represents the majority share the U.S. has in privatized warfare.  
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A. PCMFS—A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ISSUE 
PCMFs are a modern–day reality.  Interwoven into the fabric of modern warfare 
and inextricably linked to how the U.S. operates in combat and contingency operations.  
Their strategic impacts, operational support, and financial considerations have made their 
removal from DoD/DoS operations at this point is simply untenable.  In fact, this thesis 
suggests that they are not only a real modern–day variable but a very valuable asset in the 
United States’ ability to project/protect its national security interests.  As such they 
should be considered a viable option in force enhancement and operational autonomy.  
This should not occur however, until a thorough restructuring of the legal framework 
surrounding their current existence and methods of inclusion are considered.  Utilizing 
them without such a framework in place facilitates dangerous legal precedents and ushers 
in questionable business practices and confusing military operations.   
PCMFs have become part of the American bureaucracy and are now the poster 
child for the military industrial complex.  Ignoring their contributions is both a disservice 
to the private sector and a deceitful method of wishful thinking by today’s leadership—
civilian and military.  It is time that their impacts are brought to the forefront of planning 
and understanding, removing them from the umbrella of outdated and inaccurate 
regulations and placing them squarely in twenty-first century institutional control.  
Failure to do so will continue to challenge both U.S. civil–military and international 
relations unnecessarily.  
The use of twentieth century legal lexicon to define novel twenty–first century 
problems further compounds the inefficiency in regulating PCMFs.  Indeed, globalization 
has complicated once straight–forward legal categories and perhaps nowhere is this more 
apparent and more troubling than in the realm of armed conflict.137  Terms which used to 
convey status and denote privileges in times of war are no longer easily decipherable.  
There have been numerous treaties, conventions, and declarations dedicated to laws that 
govern armed conflict but these seem out of touch in modern–day warfare.  Interestingly, 
these previous regulations imply something so obvious that rarely have people paused to 
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consider it.138  Namely, it presupposes the idea that armed conflict is definable and 
identifiable—at least less ambiguous than quantifying peace.  But, is this accurate?  
Modern warfare, especially the adherence to COIN, has certainly blurred the lines of war 
and peace.  Consider that a single PCMF can be exercising private security measures 
while simultaneously undertaking massive reconstruction efforts.  War and peace are 
seemingly occurring simultaneously.  In this regard, PCMFs are entities requiring both 
the immunization from violence that war implies as well as the diplomatic and 
democratic oversight that humanitarian relief efforts necessitate.  It is altogether fitting 
then that the previously constructed theories and regulations are recognized as largely 
inappropriate regarding PCMF applicability.   
1. The Mercenary Misnomer 
Mercenaries have been a part of war since war itself.  So much so, that direct 
attention has been given to the term through The Hague Convention, The Geneva 
Conventions, and the United Nations (UN) Mercenary Convention.139  In essence, 
mercenaries are wartime profiteers, the “harbor an open commitment to war as a 
professional way of life.  That is, their cooperation entails a certain devotion to war itself, 
in that their trade benefits from its existence…mercenaries require wars, which 
necessarily involves casting aside a moral attitude toward war.”140 
But the conditions that define mercenaries and that are universally accepted as the 
legal norms—see the Conventions listed above, require that the individual or group be 
participating in armed conflict.  This means that PCMFs are not mercenaries—in the 
legal sense.  First, the ambiguity of modern warfare aside, PCMFs are rarely hired to be 
direct participants in armed conflicts and therefore are operating outside the hostilities 
needed as a pre–condition for identifying mercenaries.   Second, a mercenary is operating 
for private gain which requires proof of specific intent,141 which is virtually impossible to 
obtain. “Third, mercenaries cannot be nationals of a party in conflict or a resident of a 
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139 Ibid., 427. 
140 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 41. 
141 Yasin, Playing Catch–Up, 427. 
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territory controlled by a party in conflict.”142  This would exclude all American PCMFs 
in OIF as they hired a significant number of local nationals to augment their own 
capabilities.   
While similarities certainly exist between PCMFs and mercenaries in that both are 
non–state parties engaged for remuneration, there are many distinctions that render the 
term obsolete in reference to PCMFs.  This is generally because war, armed conflict, 
combatants, and non–combatant are all legal terms which fail to encompass the violent 
reality of post–conflict zones.143  “Because the current internationally accepted legal 
definition of mercenaries fails to encompass the amorphous structure of PCMFs, it is 
essential to formulate a definition that accords PCMFs a concise legal status.”144  
B. APPLICABILITY OF TODAY’S LEGAL MEASURES AGAINST PCMF 
UTILIZATION—DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK? 
 “Currently, no criminal or civil jurisdictional statute exists to comprehensively 
adjudicate PCMF activity. As a result, Congress has repeatedly amended existing 
legislation to bring PCMFs within a regulatory framework.”145  There are three primary 
foundations from which to potentially prosecute PCMF misconduct:  the Special 
Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute (SMTJ);146 the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA);147 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).148  “All 
three statutes suffer severe limitations in processing PCMF misconduct and fail to 
provide a complete judicial remedy.”149 
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146 The Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute, 18 U.S.C. §7 (2006). 
147 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2206). 
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1. Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute 
The SMTJ was passed in 1790 to cover eight specific areas of jurisdiction.150 It 
was amended in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT ACT.151  The SMTJ in an effort to fully 
encompass the many variables of conflict and contingency operations now contains a 
catch–all phrase the extends jurisdiction to “any place or residence in a foreign state used 
by missions or entities of the U.S. government with respect to offenses committed by or 
against a national of the United States.”152  The SMTJ was used successfully only once in 
the PCMF context, to prosecute a CIA contractor in the beating death of an Afghanistan 
detainee on a military base in Afghanistan.153  But for the most part, the SMTJ is 
unacceptable as an efficient prosecution vehicle.  First, it requires a correlation between 
criminal behavior and U.S. sovereign territory on which the act occurred.  This is why the 
SMTJ could not be used against Blackwater over the Nisour Square tragedy—the event 
happened outside of U.S. territory.  Second, the SMTJ only covers “offenses by or 
against a national of the United States.”  Again, most PCMFs hire local nationals to 
augment their capabilities and so the sector of prosecutable parties is limited. 
2. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
The MEJA is also insufficient as a punitive control measure as it too has specific 
criteria that fail to encompass the entirety of the PMI.  In essence a person can only be 
charged under the MEJA if they are a member of the Armed Forces, under the 
                                                 
150 Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the Law of War: 
Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 715 (2007). The Special Maritime and 
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151 USA PATRIOT ACT § 803. 
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employment of the Armed Forces, or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the 
territory of the U.S.  “In order to fall within the parameters of the MEJA, the following 
elements must be met: (1) the offense must be punishable with a sentence of more than 
one year; (2) the conduct must occur outside the United States.”154  Congress amended 
the MEJA in 2004 to include contractors employed by “any other Federal agency, or any 
provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of 
the Department of Defense overseas.”155  Nonetheless, the MEJA suffers the same 
territorial limitations seen in the SMTJ, i.e., that it requires the same territorial link to the 
United States.156 
3. Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Lastly, the UCMJ was amended in 2006 to include prosecutional jurisdiction over 
“persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in…time of declared war or a 
contingency operation.”157  Thus, the UCMJ theoretically subjects U.S. military 
accompanying PCMFs to military justice, suggesting both accountability and some 
measure of control through the threat of punitive action in the event of misconduct.  But, 
realistically, the UCMJ would not withstand any significant constitutional scrutiny since 
military law does not provide a Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury or a 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  Furthermore the amended UCMJ does not  
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157 See, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. See, also, Yasin, Playing Catch–Up, 430. 
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clearly define the various categories of civilians who might accompany military 
forces.158  The UCMJ is therefore, unreliable as a legal mechanism to prosecute 
PCMFs.159 
C. UNDERSTANDING MODERN THEORIES OF PCMF REGULATION 
In the previous section, we have seen that the current legal framework does not 
adequately define PCMF jurisdiction.  Further complicating matters is that the attempt to 
apply any of the previous mechanisms as enforceable parameters against PCMF 
misconduct creates more confusion than clarity and can, in essence, damage (or at least 
question) the current civil–military relationship.  This section will address the current 
proposals that attempt to close the legal loopholes regarding PCMF regulation.  Each will 
be addressed in detail in order to identify the pros and cons of their potential 
implementation as a punitive and/or regulatory vehicle.  
1. Extension of the Term “Mercenary” 
There has been some consideration to extending the definition of mercenary to 
include PCMFs but as previously discussed this seems altogether unreasonable, primarily 
because the term mercenary is tied to the phrase “armed conflict,” but also because 
PCMFs offer so much more than just “guns for hire.”  Yasin writes: 
Even if the “armed conflict” requirement were eliminated, the 
fundamental problem in applying the existing definition of “mercenary”, 
or even attempting to extend the definition to fit the PCMF dilemma 
would still exist—the PCMF, as a hybrid quasi-corporate, quasi-military 
organization, was not contemplated when the “mercenary” definition was 
formulated. As such, regulating PCMFs using an outdated, seemingly 
irrelevant framework (or a modification of the same) is intellectually 
dishonest and devoid of pragmatism. The PCMF industry provides an 
array of services so vast…one single term would be incapable of 
accurately depicting and regulating PCMFs while taking into account the 
many nuances within the industry. Indeed, “even the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for the Regulation of Mercenaries, Emanuel Ballesteros, spent 
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five years trying to come up with a workable definition of a ‘mercenary,’ 
and the result was unworkable and laughably vague.160  
 It is clear that the term mercenary is “woefully inadequate”161 in describing 
PCMFs.  Careful consideration should be given to providing them a new legal status.  
One that is much more applicable to their services and subsequent utilization.  PCMFs 
are such an anomaly and yet so intrinsically tied to U.S force projection that they must 
have their own method of regulation.  Rather than force them into pre–conceived and 
largely, unenforceable, legal frameworks, this thesis recommends the creation of a new 
one or at the very least severely reform a mechanism already in existence and tailor it to 
be specifically applicable to PCMFs.  Yasin writes: 
It is clear that governments are increasingly outsourcing the whole gamut 
of military functions to PCMFs, and therefore, it is far more pragmatic to 
regulate and define the industries using the framework that reflects the 
reality as it exists now, rather than extending the definition of “mercenary” 
to the current debate.162 
2. Corporate Self-Regulation 
Certain scholarly works have argued that corporate self–regulation can provide 
adequate measures of accountability through the implementation of strict codes of 
conduct which would enforce a system recognizing and quantifying human rights 
principles.163  The implication with this theory is that a PCMF faced with procedural 
inspections, i.e., ensuring the company has measures in place to protect and preserve 
human rights, will naturally set its own internal framework in order to placate the system 
of inspection and remain operationally functional.  While such a system would, 
theoretically, produce conditions persistent with expected norms of ethical behavior, 
especially pertaining to its own employees, it would not extend its coverage to  
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subcontractors.  Furthermore, even though PCMFs may impose such regulations upon 
themselves, they have shown a proclivity to circumvent the framework in order to cut 
costs.164  
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights is a non–binding set of 
principles designed to delineate guidelines ensuring the respect of human rights by 
PCMFs operating in combat zones.165  Participants include a wide range of state 
governments, NGOs, private companies, and those in observer status, e.g., the 
International Red Cross.166  The movement is intended to be part of a larger global effort 
to universally preserve and protect human rights in areas of conflict, but membership is 
purely voluntary and as such is relatively ineffective in serving as a controlling 
mechanism. 
Additionally, there is the PCMF non-profit trade group, International Stability 
Operations Assistance (ISOA), which currently boasts membership of fifty-five 
PCMFs.167  ISOA provides a code of conduct to “ensure the ethical standards of its 
member companies operating in conflict and post-conflict environments so that they may 
contribute their valuable services for the benefit of international peace and human 
security.”168   
Despite the fact that the [ISOA] code includes sections on transparency, 
ethics, and accountability169 and provides for the dismissal of member 
companies if they fail to uphold the provisions of the code, the code  
is not a binding document with any legal weight.  Furthermore, when 
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Blackwater withdrew from IPOA following the Nisour Square incident, 
IPOA’s ability to regulate its membership proved impotent.170 
While a self–regulating set of principles is commendable and the efforts of 
organizations assisting to supervise them are laudable, they fall short of 
controlling/regulating PCMF behavior.  Primarily due to the fact that adherence to the 
principles is purely voluntary and thus there is no substantial punitive recourse for 
deviating outside the recommended guidelines. 
3. Incorporating International Law against Corporations 
The rise of the Trans–national Corporation (TNC) is unprecedented in terms of a 
non–state actors’ influence.  The TNC has even begun to enter into realms that were 
previously the sole domain of the state, i.e., treaty negotiations and the creation of 
international organizations, e.g., the International Labor Organization.  Such behavior is 
indicative of their place in a globalized world and may point to their potential as future 
developers of International Law.  “Furthermore, TNCs are increasingly developing 
binding international law norms through customary international law.  Lex Mercatoria, or 
the law between private merchants, has been recognized as enforceable by both domestic 
courts and international tribunals.”171  Considering that international law affords TNCs 
rights and privileges, it could reasonably be concluded that “TNCs should be equally 
responsible for ensuring accountability—particularly in the realm of international human 
rights.”172  
In response to the rising influence of TNCs, the UN created a working group, in 
1998, to evaluate and re–define working business practices regarding human rights.  The 
results of the working group (published in 2003) were the Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights (Draft Norms).173  The international community failed to adopt 
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the Draft Norms however, and so the effort, while commendable, was in vain.  Ironically, 
it may have been the Draft Norms emphasis on TNC responsibility that doomed its 
international acceptance.  While, recognizing that states were the primary actors in 
international relations, the Norms concluded that the influence of TNC was so great that 
they must assume substantial global responsibility in promoting human rights.  In, fact 
the Draft Norms drew such a parallel between TNCs and nation–states that they were 
only separated by degrees.  The states’ duties to upholding human rights were considered 
primary while the same duties regarding TNCs were secondary.174  The business 
community took exception to the Norms conclusion. 
While it could be considered plausible that as TNCs continue to evolve they may 
indeed be capable of establishing international laws of expectable behavior it does not 
seem to happening any time soon.  PCMFs will most likely remain proponents of such 
propositions, at least for the time being, since acceptance of such a prominent role in the 
advancement of human rights would seem to narrow their current capabilities—at least to 
some degree.   
While this theory of regulation for PCMFs may be possible in the future, it 
appears that there is no current structure that would provide such direct 
legal accountability on corporations. As such, there is a need to develop a 
body that would adequately delineate PCMF responsibility for violations 
of human rights and delineate what state or international body would 
prosecute them.175 
4. State Doctrines of Responsibility 
Several legal discussions have proposed extending a state’s responsibility to 
punish PCMF misbehavior to contracting states.176  This is a plausible contention as 
“both international and domestic law has long recognized the principle that states may be 
subject to violations of international law even where the state has not directly committed 
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the violation.”177 The UN’s International Law Commission established “a set of 
principles which govern the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”178 
These principles came to be known as the Draft Articles. 
The Draft Articles are essentially divided into two parts.  Part one refers to the 
primary rules (responsibilities) of states.  Namely, that states are held directly 
accountable for actions inherently and universally tied to the Westphalian state, e.g., 
adherence to the Law of the Sea and the legitimate use of force.  Part two refers to the 
secondary rules of the state.   
Essentially, [the] secondary rules place responsibility upon the states for 
acts committed by state agents.  Thus, the Draft Articles create a 
framework within which states may be liable for illegal actions that have 
been committed by another entity, so long as a nexus exists between the 
state and the acting agent.179  
There has been discussion advocating the rules of attribution be extended to 
PCMFs in combat zones and/or operating in contingency operations.  This is summarized 
by Professor Steven Ratner, who writes: “This theory asserts that corporate duties are a 
function of four clusters of issues: the corporation’s relationship with the government, its 
nexus to affected populations, the particular human right at issue, and the place of 
individuals violating human rights within the corporate structure.”180  Essentially, this 
provides two legal recourses to affect control over PCMFs by assigning liability to the 
state: (1) if the corporation is performing duties so inherently governmental that the 
corporate entity should be considered an organ of the state.  (2) If the entity does not meet 
the latter criteria, the state may still be liable if it has total control over the corporation.  
With these two possibilities considered, it is reasonable to conclude that a state may be 
held legally liable for PCMF misconduct.181 
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Influencing PCMF behavior by extending punitive measures to states is, in theory, 
a sound contention but in practice seems unlikely.  There are just too many legal 
loopholes and extenuating variables for this theory to withstand any substantial scrutiny 
and thus serve as an effective regulatory mechanism.  Yasin sums this up succinctly in 
the following:  
While using principles of attribution based on state responsibility may 
provide a potential means of accountability, the theory falls short of 
providing comprehensive regulation of PCMFs on several levels.  First, 
the Draft Articles are not binding and are, in fact, expressly intended to be 
non-binding.  As such, any legal argument based upon attribution must 
affirmatively demonstrate that the Draft Articles have become part of 
customary international law.  Second, the international courts that have 
adjudicated claims involving state liability have employed the “overall 
control” test, which requires a high evidentiary burden of proof.  Third, 
there is no designated international body that monitors non-state actors, 
and although the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) may arguably 
exercise jurisdiction, the United States, as the largest PCMF employer, has 
expressly repudiated its jurisdiction. Thus, it seems very unlikely that 
PCMF misconduct will be legally imputable to the employing state, and 
even assuming arguendo that liability were attributed, there is no 
enforcement mechanism, particularly in the case of the United States.182 
5. Contract Regulations 
Currently, there is little if any transparency within the PCMF marketplace. The 
majority of PCMF contracts have been awarded on a no–bid basis, free from peer 
competition and devoid of public disclosure regarding the contracts terms.  This process 
has severely hampered any legitimate accountability measures.  To make matters worse 
these contracts are often sub–contracted out, complicating an already opaque system 
through additional layers of business agreements.  The no–bid process has eliminated the 
open market system with the former being the predominate method of doing business in 
OIF.  In fact, it is estimated that only $47 million was awarded to PCMFs bidding in the 
open market, translating to billions of dollars being awarded to PCMFs devoid of any 
competition an outside public scrutiny.183  Even the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
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fails to provide any real insight into the PCMF’s contracting methods.  Although, through 
the FOIA, PCMFs can be petitioned to produce contractual terms, the PCMF can claim 
“confidentiality” on behalf of the entity or person with whom they are doing business.  
This in effect provides PCMFs with veto authority and renders full public disclosure 
highly unlikely. Furthermore, although military contracts could in theory be requested, 
this would potentially violate the FOIA’s national security clause, thus preventing release 
of any relevant documents.  
PCMF contracts generally have two primary classifications: (1) Blanket purchase 
or (2) Cost–plus agreements.  Blanket purchase agreements, often referred to as indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts refer to a process in which the principal 
requests items or services as the need arises.  While commonplace, the process creates an 
open–ended contract with uncertain parameters.  Cost–plus contracts are awarded to a 
PCMF under the pretense that the government has agreed to a fixed fee regardless of 
performance.  This contract virtually eliminates incentives for ensuring quality services 
as well as controlling costs.184   
Some commentators have recommended an extensive reform of the contractual 
process, incorporating public law values in the underlying contractual agreement.185 
“Because contracts are the very instruments that facilitate the shift from the public realm 
(of military duties) to the private sector, it follows that the contract should codify the 
level of accountability to which a public actor would be subject. Thus, states could use 
the contract as the mechanism for eliminating the disparity between the public and 
private spheres, by aligning interests and accountability.”186 
While plausible as a possible controlling mechanism, contract regulation cannot 
stand alone.  Yasin contends that there are numerous variables187 why the contracting 
process may not be ample enough to strictly regulate PCMF behavior.  While this seems 
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accurate, the contracting process is nonetheless a solid foundation from which to extend a 
regulatory framework and, at the very least, should be considered a vital instrument in 
influencing PCMF behavior and subsequently, effective legal control. 
6. Market Regulations 
There is some relative discourse on the applicability of open–market influence 
affecting the accountability of PCMFs but this, as seen previously, is a relatively flawed 
argument as it presupposes the cost–effective benefits of market competition.  As already 
discussed the majority of PCMFs enter into contractual obligations largely devoid of any 
substantial competition and so the idea of market regulation seems to hold little merit.  
Even after claims of fraud and abuse or tragic incidents directly involving PCMF 
personnel the market rarely if ever holds PCMFs accountable.  A perfect example of this 
is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in which CACI personnel were directly implicated for 
egregious behavior.  The USG not only failed to cancel the standing contract, it actually 
extended it.  “Furthermore, in March of 2010, CACI was awarded a $588 million 
indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity contract to support the U.S. Navy’s Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command’s command and control operations.”188  Outcomes 
such as these render the market regulation theory highly skeptical as an effective 
mechanism of PCMF control. 
7. Extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
The MEJA was simply never intended to incorporate private security companies 
or contractors supporting USG endeavors in a conflict zone.  It was based on a domestic 
case of spousal abuse in Germany.189  It holds the same intrinsic ties to territory that the 
SMTJ does.  Even after Congress amended the MEJA in 2004, it still lacks sufficient  
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legal authority to withstand extensive scrutiny.  Peter Singer revealed the weaknesses 
within the MEJA through a hypothetical scenario in which a drunken contractor killed an 
Iraqi civilian: 
Some US attorney would have had to decide to prosecute the accused, 
even though the victim and accused wasn’t in his district, fly out to the 
base in Iraq multiple times, try to track down and depose witnesses (who 
most likely would have been deployed all over the place to avoid him), 
and then sell it to a jury back in the US, likely spending his entire yearly 
budget on one case when he is actually being judged by his bosses on his 
prosecutions of a lacrosse team, gang violence, or whatever. They would 
decide it’s a loser and most likely bury it in an “open file” somewhere. 
And this is if there were no political pressures, and the accused was 
actually in custody, which military folks haven’t been putting contractors 
in when they know of such events.190 
Considering the difficulties in applying the MEJA to PCMF personnel the 
recognition of the Act as an effective control mechanism seems virtually untenable.  The 
MEJA could become viable, however, if sufficient international measures were taken in 
concert.  It is possible that the MEJA could be used as a vehicle for domestic jurisdiction, 
but, again, not without significant changes.191  
8. Creation of an International Body 
This chapter seconds the recommendation of Peter Singer, i.e., the creation of an 
international body as an autonomous governing organization to regulate PCMF behavior 
and facilitate firm legal regulations capable of punishing deviation from prescripted 
norms.192  But it should be noted (and as mentioned in the previous chapter), that 
recommending such an entity is easy, seeing it to fruition, highly difficult.  A public 
international body (PIB) would provide legitimacy to PCMF utilization greater than what 
currently exists, but it would require the U.S. to support an entity that, quite frankly, is 
not as personally invested in PCMFs as the U.S. DoD and DoS.  Further, if the U.S. is 
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able to generate enough political will domestically to regulate and institutionalize PCMF 
behavior, why then, would they defer the authority internationally?   
First, the international body would fall under the auspices of the United Nations 
and be comprised of regulatory experts able to effectively vet PCMFs as sanctioned 
businesses.  Next, this body would have the “right of refusal” applying incentives for 
appropriate behavior ranging from following human rights protocols to proper contractual 
processes.  When taken together these first two criteria alleviate the U.S. from assuming 
sole responsibility for contract management and from being held directly responsible 
(even if only argumentative) for PCMF behavior.  Of course this presupposes that the 
U.S. and the PMI are willing to allow external, international reviews of the contracting 
process.  Admittedly, this may not be financially beneficial for the PCMF but this is 
exactly my point.  The creation of the international process institutes (and incorporates) 
some of the already suggested theories for reform, e.g., corporate self–regulation, state 
doctrines of responsibility, and contract and market regulations.  In doing so, the 
international body shows both financial and moral promise, i.e., mitigating the cost–plus 
and no–bid process, while protecting states from human rights violations – or at least 
provide a legitimate means for punitive recourse should such an event occur. 
Such an international body is the first step in achieving any tangible regulatory 
reforms necessary for full–fledged and legitimate PCMF inclusion.  While this thesis 
agrees with Yasin, that PCMF regulation is an “international problem requiring an 
international solution.”193  This chapter recommends that such a solution cannot occur 
without the express interest of the United States.  As such, the recommendations 
advanced must be tempered with the expectations of full U.S. involvement.   
The establishment of the international body is central to this thesis’ hypothesis 
that establishing a status-based, legal framework will promote legitimacy, increase 
effectiveness, and mitigate concerns—both domestically and abroad.  Furthermore, the 
creation of such an organization is the underlying basis for this chapter’s regulatory 
framework and would be the primary mechanism by which “PCMF status would be 
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explicitly designated and the corresponding legal obligations attached.”194  This chapter 
will conclude by combining Singer’s recommendations with Yasin’s extensive research.    
D. SEEKING A STATUS-BASED FRAMEWORK AND THE CREATION OF 
THE PIB 
Perhaps no function of government is deemed more quintessentially a 
‘state’ function than the military protection of the state itself.  Indeed, 
scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere have often assumed that 
privatization of the military is one area where privatization does not, or 
should not, occur.195   
This is a significant point as PCMFs exist in a nexus of civil–military provisions.  Both 
entities can provide services mutually exclusive of each other or in a symbiotic 
relationship.  But whereas, the military has a strict code of enforcing its standards, e.g., 
the UCMJ; the PCMF has no such definitive framework.  Ironically, PCMFs operate 
within virtually the same environment as the military yet is not subject to the same 
regulations.  PCMFs are also growing in numbers, scope, and influence but the 
international community as yet has failed to recognize this fact.  But ignoring the 
problem, regardless of how convenient, does not make it go away. 
“International and domestic law must adapt to bring PCMFs within the purview of 
a legal framework that would accord both accountability and protection based on 
assigning PCMFs a definitive legal status.”196  The current legal ambiguity is neither 
sustainable nor pragmatic—permitting PCMFs to operate free from punitive measures, 
setting dangerous legal precedents in the process.  “Furthermore, the absence of any legal 
consensus regarding PCMFs results in uncertainties and inconsistent results. For 
example, which states have jurisdiction to prosecute, what laws govern misconduct, and 
to whom—or, alternatively, to what—is the PCMF responsible?”197  
The majority of scholarly discussions regarding PCMF regulation attempts to 
include them into pre–existing legal definition or body of law.  But these attempts offer 
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little substantive value into rectifying the confusion.  In fact, these attempts actually help 
demonstrate just how clouded the law of governing PCMFs has become.  An intensive 
restructuring of the legal framework addressing PCMFs would be much more effective 
for all parties involved. 
This chapter concurs with Yasin, in that there must first be a “comprehensive 
multilateral treaty that defines the status of PCMFs, delineates jurisdiction, and provides 
for mandatory domestic enforcement in response to any violations of the treaty norms 
that occur.”198 This is in direct support of the public international body (PIB) proposed 
by Singer.199  Singer’s PIB would be led by a task force that includes virtually all 
stakeholders with interests in PCMF utilization.  These would be, but not limited to, the 
following: “state actors, human rights NGOs, PCMFs themselves, and experts on 
international human rights law and humanitarian law.”200  Yasin further defines Singer’s 
PIB by assigning four primary responsibilities to the task force.   In no certain order: 
the task force would be responsible for: (1) creating status–based 
categories defining the type of PCMF;201 (2) determining codes of 
acceptable conduct, accountability, and protection relative to ascribed 
status; (3) registering, auditing, and providing ongoing oversight of PCMF 
activities; and (4) providing a mandatory requirement for contracting 
states to prosecute PCMFs in cases of misconduct.202  
The PIB would require corporations to register as PCMFs, cementing the vetting 
process within a disinterested third–party.  This registration provides would provide the 
global community with an ample pool of potential suppliers of various force related 
provisions.  Further, the registration process would facilitate assigning the registering 
corporation into one of the six classifications seen in Chapter I.  This classification would 
also assist in assigning the PCMF a set of conditions, expectations, and legal guidelines 
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in direct proportion to their potential exposure to hostilities.  Failure of a PCMF to 
register with the PIB removes them from the list of legitimate considerations for force 
provision and with it; the potential legal protection awarded its employees and hiring 
agent(s).  Additionally, the PIB would theoretically, serve as an additional layer of 
protection regarding humanitarian issues, ensuring that registered PCMFs are in 
accordance with international accepted human rights norms.  This should be an altogether 
desirable condition for the PCMF as it insulates them, to a degree, from human rights 
violations.  The PIB would be an international mediator between the PCMF and the 
hiring principal and would ensure proper protocol regarding contractual obligations as 
well as serve as a guarantor of PCMF capabilities—ensuring that the “PCMF is in fact 
capable of performing services offered effectively.”203  Finally, the PIB’s involvement 
would “provide transparency and serve to effectively eradicate no–bid, GSA, or illicit 
contracts, and will provide oversight to dubious sub–contracts.”204   
While the existence of rogue refusals to participate in the PIB or accept its 
suggestions is certainly a possibility, “states stand to benefit considerably from the 
enactment of such an international body.”205  The PIB would provide consistency to an 
inconsistent market, classifying corporations with assurance of services.  This provides 
states with a guarantee that they are contracting a legitimate corporation for legitimate 
ends.  Yasin writes: 
As such, states may contract freely with registered PCMFs without risking 
liability under doctrines of state responsibility.  This relieves states of the 
significant onus of continued oversight and regulation over companies.  
The value of this effect cannot be overstated––if states are outsourcing 
primarily for market efficiencies, but have to perform an ongoing 
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While the creation of the PIB is critical to establishing any substantial status–
based regulations and facilitating the necessary reforms required for efficient PCMF 
utilization, so too are the precedents of the United States, specifically as they relate to the 
code of law regarding PCMF utilization.  Failure to adopt more stringent methods of 
control over PCMF behavior, and the contracting process as a whole, will continue to 
exacerbate an already tumultuous situation.  As suggested throughout this work, if the 
U.S. does not fully recognize formally and publicly the reliance it has placed on PCMFs, 
then encouraging reformation from the international community will seem hypocritical at 
best.  For the multilateral treaty defining PCMFs and the PIB to be effective it must be 
embraced first by the U.S.  Congress must consider adopting statutes incorporating the 
treaty’s provisions into domestic law.  Further, rather than continuing to amend 
inapplicable measures, e.g., the MEJA, Congress should consider creating a statute 
specifically for PCMFs providing the PMI ample notice for potential prosecutions.207  
Finally, “Congress should pass a criminal and civil jurisdictional vehicle to 
comprehensibly cover all PCMF behavior where the United States is the contracting state 
or where the PCMF is a registered corporation in the United States.”208  Such measures, 
while admittedly bold, should garner strong international support209 and would almost 
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Domestically, these measures would bring PCMFs under the collective fold of U.S. civil 
military relations, taking great strides towards democratic civilian control, effectiveness, 
and efficiency.210   
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VII. SUMMARY AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
Chapter I introduced us to the term Privately Contracted Military Firm (PCMF) 
and provided a brief, macro view of the Private Military Industry (PMI) 
Chapter II discussed the rise of the PMI as a whole, the subsequent proliferation 
of PCMFs, and assigned them to six discernible classifications.  While the history of the 
PCMF is of course necessary it is the classification with which the majority of attention 
should be given as these classifications become essential to the author’s 
recommendations. 
Chapter III suggested that the Vietnam War may have set the conditions for future 
U.S. reliance on PCMFs.  This chapter does not intend to counter conventional theory––
that PCMFs began to materialize as we know them post–Cold War.  On the contrary, this 
chapter means to compliment that theory, but extends the discussion to include the 
Vietnam era due to the highly unethical business and political decisions that seemed to 
surround that particular war.  While of course controversial, it is not unreasonable to 
believe similar business/political practices are facilitating PCMF influence today.  This 
chapter also takes a critical look at how the U.S. military’s reliance on COIN—a theory 
rooted in Vietnam—may be exacerbating PCMF reliance.   
Chapter IV focused on PCMF utilization in OIF and OEF but the preponderance 
of information centered on the Iraq Theater of War.  There were two primary reasons for 
this: (1) the author has extensive experience with and first–hand knowledge of PCMFs in 
Iraq; and (2) there is substantial information coming out from OIF now that the war has 
all but ended—albeit, from a purely military standpoint.  This chapter also identified a 
potentially tremendous benefit that PCMFs provide—mainly that their existence and 
subsequent utilization on the battlefield alleviates the U.S. military from deploying more 
troops than currently witnessed. 
Chapter V was comprised of two distinct parts.  Part one, focused on the 
tremendous disparity in America’s strategic documents regarding the inclusion of 
PCMFs.  This peculiarity highlights a larger point, that until the U.S. adopts more 
meaningful language and directly accepts responsibility for its reliance on PCMFs, the 
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ambiguity of PCMF legality will continue, making any substantial reform measures 
highly difficult.  Furthermore, without U.S. agreement to such, the international 
community will continue to remain morally detached from enforcing PCMF 
accountability.  
Part two, addressed the three dimensions of civil–military relations as defined by 
Professor Thomas C. Bruneau.  The” trinity” of democratic civilian control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency are presented as a theoretical foundation to designing a 
status–based framework capable of effectively governing the new entity within CMR––
the PCMF.   
This chapter also recognized the difficulty in establishing democratic control over 
PCMFs from an international standpoint – introduced in this chapter for future 
consideration as a possible (and significant) reform measure. 
Finally, Chapter VI concludes with the extensive legal recommendations for 
PCMF regulatory reform.  This chapter draws heavily from the extensive research 
performed by Huma Yasin as well as the ideas advanced by one of the foremost experts 
on PCMFs—Peter Singer.  Combining the efforts of both, respectively, with the 
theoretical provisions provided by Thomas Bruneau, this chapter presents an international 
body capable of governing the discernible classifications of PCMFs effectively, 
efficiently, and under the auspices of democratic civilian control. 
This thesis concludes that PCMFs are a valuable addition to twenty-first century 
warfare.  Their contributions cannot be ignored.  But so many stigmas seem to follow 
their use that ignoring them almost seems the best possible course of action.  This thesis 
contends that is exactly what should not be done.  Three overall areas were covered that 
support this recommendation.  First, the cost-effectiveness of utilizing PCMFs is 
questionable but this thesis argues that these costs can be mitigated through extensive 
reform measures.  Further, these reforms may prove beneficial across the entire spectrum 
of COIN as the actions of those supporting the force can be just as significant as the 
forces themselves.  Failure to fully grasp the operational environment by all parties can 
cause duplicity of effort and exhaust valuable resources unnecessarily.  Second, the sheer 
number of contracted personnel cannot be discounted.  In OIF alone, some one hundred 
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and eighty thousand contractors supported DoD/DoS endeavors.  Absent reinstituting a 
draft, these numbers are virtually irreplaceable.  Although public concerns may center on 
the financial expenditures of the USG towards PCMF employment, it is hard to believe 
these concerns would retain their integrity if talk of a reinstituting the draft became 
prevalent.  Last, the errant behavior patterns exhibited by a select few PCMFs are not 
indicative of the entities themselves as much as of the system which cannot adequately 
enforce human rights standards and ethical norms.  Although it is theoretically possible 
that the U.S. could resolve these issues domestically, I do not believe that such a 
resolution would be nearly as effective as it could be should it be created internationally.  
Creating a PIB similar in scope to both Singer’s and Yasin’s conclusions would not only 
be more effective, it would also be more efficient—alleviating the burden of 
responsibility, not sovereignty, from the U.S. Such an endeavor would require substantial 
political will but I believe that if the U.S. were to lead this charge the government would 
be in position to influence the outcome—something that has proven historically accurate 
and advantageous—both to U.S. national security interests and to the expansion of global 
norms of democratic civilian control.  Perhaps, best summed up by Professor Bruneau, 
who writes: 
Until Congress and the White House are ready to acknowledge that this is 
an issue critical to the country’s defense and security, until the Department 
of Defense is able to change the way it does business, and until lawmakers 
can pass, and enforce implementation of, the needed legislation, we are 
likely to continue dealing with confusion, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency 
of private [military] contracting as it is today.211 
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